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Accommodating Everyone 
Nicole Buonocore Porter* 
This Article attempts to eliminate “special treatment stigma” by accommodating 
everyone.  Special treatment stigma occurs when some employees (usually individuals 
with disabilities and workers with caregiving responsibilities) are provided with 
accommodations in the workplace.  This receipt of “special treatment” causes employers 
and coworkers to resent these employees.  This Article argues that the best way to 
ameliorate the stigma that accompanies special treatment in the workplace is to 
accommodate everyone through a universal accommodation mandate.  This mandate 
would require employers to accommodate all employees who request an accommodation 
in the workplace, regardless of the reason for the accommodation.  As long as the 
accommodation requested was “reasonable” and did not cause an “undue hardship,” 
employers would be required to provide it.  However, recognizing that some reasons for 
requesting accommodations are truly more compelling than other reasons, I propose the 
implementation of a two-tier undue hardship analysis.  Thus, for accommodations that 
are necessary either to allow an employee to perform the essential functions of the job or 
to allow an employee to attend to unavoidable caregiving obligations, the undue 
hardship defense would be the more stringent test used under the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, where “undue hardship” is defined as “significant difficulty or 
expense.”  For all other accommodation requests, the employer would still be required to 
grant them as long as they do not cause an undue hardship using the more lenient 
standard used for religious accommodations under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, where undue hardship has been defined as anything more than a “de minimis 
expense.”  My hope is that this universal accommodation mandate—which allows all 
employees to request an accommodation but recognizes at least some hierarchy between 
necessary accommodations and all other accommodations—will eliminate the harm 
caused by special treatment stigma while still creating a workable standard. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In prior work, I argued that there is a common bond between 
employees with disabilities and workers with caregiving 
responsibilities.1  That common bond is based on these employees’ 
 
* Professor of Law, University of Toledo College of Law.  I would like to thank 
participants at the Accommodations Discussion Group at the Southeastern Association 
of Law Schools Annual Conference in August 2015 and the participants at the AALS 
2015 Mid-Year Meeting on Next Generation Issues on Sex & Gender, where I 
presented earlier versions of this paper.  More specifically, at the risk of being under-
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failure to meet their employers’ workplace expectations, or failure to 
comply with the “ideal worker”2 norm.3  This failure often causes these 
employees to request job modifications, which are often stigmatized as 
special treatment—I call this “special-treatment stigma.”4  The 
perception of special treatment causes these employees to be 
stigmatized by their employers and by their coworkers.5  Employers 
often believe accommodating workers is expensive and burdensome,6 
so they might refuse to provide accommodations if those 
accommodations are not required by law. Alternatively, employers 
might choose to not hire or promote employees who need 
accommodations.7  The stigma from coworkers is less overt; coworkers 
often resent accommodations given to employees either because those 
accommodations cause burdens on the coworkers or the 
accommodation is something that the coworkers covet.8  This coworker 
resentment in turn makes employers uncomfortable, and gives them 
another reason to refuse to provide accommodations or to avoid 
employing individuals who need accommodations. 
Because both groups of employees—individuals with disabilities 
and workers with caregiving responsibilities—share this common 
experience, I argued in prior work that caregiving should be 
accommodated in the same way as disability is accommodated9 under 
the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”).10  I relied on the 
 
inclusive, I would like to thank Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Vicki Schultz, Gowri 
Ramachandran, Jessica Clarke, Deborah Widiss, Nancy Leong, Bradley Areheart, 
Michael Waterstone, Kerri Stone, Jessica Roberts, Elizabeth Pendo, and Ani Satz.  I 
would also like to thank the faculty at the University of Toledo College of Law for their 
helpful comments during a workshop, and the University of Toledo College of Law for 
its summer research support.  Finally, special thanks to Bryan Lammon, both 
professionally (for giving me the title of this paper and very helpful edits) and 
personally (for everything else). 
       1  Nicole Buonocore Porter, Mutual Marginalization: Individuals with Disabilities and 
Workers with Caregiving Responsibilities, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1099, 1103–15 (2014).  
 2  This phrase was first coined by Joan Williams and is now used by many in 
work/family scholarship.  See JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND 
WORK CONFLICT AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 1 (1999). 
 3  Porter, supra note 1, at 1104–08.  
 4  I coined this phrase to refer to the stigma individuals suffer from when receiving 
special treatment in the workplace.  Nicole Buonocore Porter, Why Care About 
Caregivers? Using Communitarian Theory to Justify Protection of “Real” Workers, 58 U. KAN. 
L. REV. 355, 359 (2010) [hereinafter Porter, Why Care].  
 5  Porter, supra note 1, at 1108.  
 6  Id.  
 7  Id.  
 8  Id. at 1111–12.  
 9  Id. at 1138–52.  
 10  42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2008). 
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communitarian theory to demonstrate that accommodating both 
workers with caregiving responsibilities and individuals with disabilities 
benefits the workplace community, which includes employers, 
employees, and society.11  At that time, I specifically explored and 
rejected a universal accommodation mandate.12  A universal 
accommodation mandate would allow employees to request 
accommodations for any variation of the job functions, the workplace 
environment, or the structural norms13 of the workplace, regardless of 
the reason for the request.14  Although I recognized that 
accommodating everyone through a universal mandate would be the 
only way to truly end the stigma that accompanies special treatment,15 
I could not envision a workable universal accommodation mandate.  I 
imagined all kinds of difficult line-drawing decisions employers would 
have to make when figuring out whether a specific accommodation is 
necessary, even though the specific reason for the accommodation 
could not be challenged.16  Thus, I ultimately rejected a universal 
accommodation mandate, and as discussed above, I focused on 
arguing in favor of accommodating caregivers in the same way that we 
currently accommodate individuals with disabilities.17 
But for reasons I discuss below, and after much thoughtful 
deliberation, I have reversed my way of thinking on both issues.  I no 
longer think an accommodation mandate for only caregivers and 
individuals with disabilities is workable, for several reasons.  First, the 
accommodation most often requested by both caregivers and 
individuals with disabilities is a modification to the structural norms of 
the workplace,18 but (as I have explored in other works) these 
structural norms are very entrenched in most workplaces, and most 
employers are reluctant to modify them.19  Second, I have reluctantly 
arrived at the realization that we will never eliminate special-treatment 
 
 11  Porter, supra note 1, at 1138–51.  
 12  Id. at 1133–38. 
 13  The “structural norms” of the workplace refer to hours, shifts, schedules, 
attendance policies, overtime requirements, and leave of absence policies—the when 
and where work is performed.  See Nicole Buonocore Porter, The New ADA Backlash, 82 
TENN. L. REV. 1, 70–71 (2014) [hereinafter Porter, Backlash].  
 14  Porter, supra note 1, at 1135. 
 15  Id. at 1133–35. 
 16  Id. at 1136. 
 17  Id. at 1138–52. 
 18  See, e.g., Lisa Schur et al., Accommodating Employees with and Without Disabilities, 53 
HUM. RESOURCES MGMT. 593, 601 (2014).  
 19  Porter, Backlash, supra note 13, at 73–78; Nicole Buonocore Porter, Caregiver 
Conundrum Redux: The Entrenchment of Structural Norms, 91 DENV. U. L. REV. 963, 981–
86 (2014) [hereinafter Porter, Entrenchment]. 
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stigma as long as we continue to give what appears to be preferential 
treatment to certain groups of employees. 
Moreover, I now believe that I can conceptualize a workable 
universal accommodation mandate.  This Article is devoted to that 
effort.  Specifically, I propose and justify accommodating everyone20 
through a universal accommodation mandate that avoids some of the 
earlier problems I had identified by utilizing a two-tier “undue 
hardship” test. 
As many readers know, the undue hardship analysis appears in 
two places in the employment discrimination context.  Under the 
ADA, employers have to provide reasonable accommodations to 
employees with disabilities as long as they do not cause an undue 
hardship on the employer.21  Undue hardship is defined as “significant 
difficulty or expense.”22  The other place we see the concept of undue 
hardship is in the religious discrimination context under Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  There, under section 701(j) of the statute, 
Congress defined religion to include “all aspects of religious 
observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer 
demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an 
employee’s . . . religious observance or practice without undue 
hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.”23  Even though 
undue hardship is not defined in the statute with respect to religious 
accommodations, the Supreme Court defined it to mean anything 
more than a “de minimis cost.”24 
I use these two different undue hardship standards to propose a 
universal accommodation mandate with a two-tier undue hardship 
analysis.  Thus, if an accommodation is necessary either because the 
employee cannot perform the essential functions of the job without it 
or because the employee would be neglecting an unavoidable 
caregiving obligation without it, the accommodation would have to be 
granted so long as it does not cause an undue hardship under the more 
 
 20  Some readers might be familiar with the recent article published by well-known 
disability scholars: Accommodating Every Body.  Michael Ashley Stein et al., Accommodating 
Every Body, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 689 (2014).  As I explain below, my proposal is different 
from theirs because their proposal calls for accommodating all individuals who need 
an accommodation to be able to physically perform the functions of their job.  Id. at 
693.  My proposal involves accommodating not just every “body,” but literally 
“everyone.”  
 21  42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2009).  
 22  42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(A) (2008).  
 23  42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1991).  
 24  See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977).  
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stringent test under the ADA—“significant difficulty or expense.”25  For 
all other accommodation requests, the accommodation would have to 
be granted unless the employer could demonstrate that the 
accommodation would cause an undue hardship using the more 
lenient test developed in the religious accommodation context, where 
anything more than a de minimis expense is considered an undue 
hardship.  My goal with proposing this universal accommodation 
mandate with the two-tier undue hardship test is two-fold: eliminating 
the stigma that accompanies special treatment, and creating a 
workable proposal that recognizes that some accommodations are 
more necessary than others. 
This Article proceeds in four additional parts.  Part II elaborates 
on the common bond experienced by individuals with disabilities and 
workers with caregiving responsibilities, explaining how their failure 
to conform to the ideal worker norm has led to the marginalization of 
both groups because of the stigma that accompanies the need for 
special treatment in the workplace.  Part II also explains why I believe 
my prior proposal to only accommodate these two groups of employees 
is unworkable. 
Part III sets forth my proposal for a universal accommodation 
mandate that will hopefully work to end the stigma that accompanies 
special treatment in the workplace.  It discusses why I rejected the idea 
of a universal accommodation mandate in prior work before turning 
to the mechanics of how this universal accommodation mandate, with 
its two-tier undue hardship analysis, would operate.  This Part also 
provides the justifications for this proposal.  Part IV responds to the 
anticipated criticism likely to be lobbed at this effort.  Finally, Part V 
briefly concludes. 
II. THE COMMON BOND26 
This Part will explore the common bond between individuals with 
disabilities and workers with caregiving responsibilities.  Although I 
recognize the significant differences between these two groups of 
employees,27 the common bond they share in the workplace is what 
leads to the marginalization of both groups of employees. 
 
 25  42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(A) (2008).  
 26  This Part is derived in part from my earlier work.  Porter, supra note 1, at 1103–
15; Nicole Buonocore Porter, Special Treatment Stigma After the ADA Amendments Act, 43 
PEPP. L. REV. 213 (2016) [hereinafter Porter, Stigma]. 
 27  Porter, supra note 1, at 1119–31 (explaining the differences between the two 
groups of employees, but ultimately arguing that the differences are not so significant 
as to justify the different treatment in the law). 
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A. Cannot Conform to the Ideal-Worker Norm 
Both individuals with disabilities and workers with caregiving 
responsibilities have difficulty meeting their employers’ expectations.  
Primarily, these two groups of employees have difficulty meeting the 
“structural norms” of the workplace—the policies involving when and 
where work is performed.28  Most jobs are built around an able-bodied 
and masculine norm.29  This norm expects employees to be available 
to work full-time and overtime, often at a moment’s notice.30  Many 
jobs also have strict attendance policies and very rigid hours, schedules, 
and shifts.31  Individuals with disabilities often need time off for 
medical appointments or to address the physical manifestations of 
their disabilities.32  They also might need a change in hours or reduced 
hours in order to successfully work with their disability.33  Workers with 
caregiving responsibilities often need time off to take children or adult 
loved ones to medical or other appointments,34 and they often miss 
work if children are sick and cannot attend school or daycare.35  
Furthermore, workers with caregiving responsibilities might need or 
want to work particular shifts or hours in order to more successfully 
combine work with their children’s daycare or school schedules.36  In 
addition to the difficulty these groups of employees have meeting the 
structural norms of the workplace, some employees also have difficulty 
performing the physical functions of the job.  This Part will take each 
of these problems in turn. 
1. Structural Norms of the Workplace37 
There are plenty of cases demonstrating the difficulty both groups 
of employees have meeting their employers’ demands regarding the 
structural norms of the workplace.  For instance, in the caregiving 
context, many workers faced termination because they had too many 
absences due to pregnancy or caregiving responsibilities.38  In one case, 
 
 28  Id. at 1104. 
 29  Porter, Why Care, supra note 4, at 362. 
 30  Porter, Entrenchment, supra note 19, at 966. 
 31  Porter, Why Care, supra note 4, at 362.  
 32  In fact, as stated above, the most commonly requested accommodation by 
employees with disabilities was a change to the employee’s work schedule.  Schur et 
al., supra note 18, at 601.  
 33  See id. 
 34  Porter, Why Care, supra note 4, at 361. 
 35  Id. 
 36  Id. at 361–62. 
 37  This Part is derived in significant part from Porter, supra note 1, at 1104–07. 
 38  See Nicole Buonocore Porter, Synergistic Solutions: An Integrated Approach to 
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the plaintiff was terminated one day before a scheduled maternity 
leave for being tardy due to severe morning sickness.39  She lost her 
lawsuit.40 
And as I’ve noted before, “Some of the most troubling [work/
family] conflict stories involve a caregiver having to make the 
impossible decision between leaving a child alone or losing [her] 
job.”41  For instance, one woman was terminated because her child was 
in a car accident and had to be taken to the hospital.42  Another mother 
left her one-year-old and nine-year-old children home alone because 
the babysitter did not arrive on time and the mother’s employer had 
threatened termination if she did not report to work; while she was 
gone, the children died in a fire.43  There is no federal protection for 
the woman in the latter story.44  It is possible that the woman in the first 
story could have been eligible for leave under the Family and Medical 
Leave Act (FMLA), but that statute only covers employers with fifty or 
more employees and only covers employees who have worked for the 
employer for at least one year.45  And even when employees are eligible 
for leave under the FMLA, simply requesting that leave can stigmatize 
those employees.46  In fact, some argue that women who are of child-
bearing age experience stigma because their employers believe they 
will request leave, even if they have yet to do so.47 
Even when not subject to strict attendance policies, many 
caregivers have difficulty meeting the overtime requirements or the 
 
Solving the Caregiving Conundrum for “Real” Workers, 39 STETSON L. REV. 777, 783–85, 
847–48 (2010) [hereinafter Porter, Synergistic Solutions].  
 39  Troupe v. May Dep’t Stores, 20 F.3d 734, 735 (7th Cir. 1994).  
 40  Id. 
 41  Porter, Why Care, supra note 4, at 407–08.  
 42  9TO5, NAT’L ASS’N OF WORKING WOMEN, 10 Things That Could Happen to You If 
You Didn’t Have Paid Sick Days and the Best Way to Make Sure they Never Happen to Anyone, 
4 (2014), 
http://njtimetocare.com/sites/default/files/18_Ten%20Things%20That%20Could
%20Happen%20to%20You%20if%20You%20Didnt%20Have%20Paid%20Sick%20D
ays.pdf.  
 43  Nina Bernstein, Daily Choice Turned Deadly: Children Left on Their Own, N.Y. TIMES 
(Oct. 19, 2003), http://www.nytimes.com/2003/10/19/nyregion/daily-choice-
turned-deadly-children-left-on-their-own.html?pagewanted=all. 
 44  See Nicole Buonocore Porter, Finding a Fix for the FMLA: A New Perspective, A New 
Solution, 31 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 327, 340–41 (2013) [hereinafter Porter, FMLA].  
 45  5 U.S.C. §§ 6381–6387 (2012); 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2654 (2006 & Supp. V 2011). 
 46  Thus, this is the reason that the Family and Medical Leave Act was drafted to be 
gender neutral.  Porter, FMLA, supra note 44, at 333–34.  
 47  See Nicole Buonocore Porter, Embracing Caregiving and Respecting Choice: An Essay 
on the Debate Over Changing Gender Norms, 41 SW. U. L. REV. 1, 40 (2011).  
PORTER (DO NOT DELETE) 11/3/2016  1:17 PM 
2016] ACCOMMODATING EVERYONE 93 
face-time requirements of their employers.48  For instance, in one case, 
a divorced single mother was fired when she requested to work more 
manageable hours than the almost fourteen-hour, six day-a-week 
schedule that her employer demanded.49  Many professional women 
seek—and suffer stigma from—working part time or reduced-hour 
schedules.50 
Individuals with disabilities also have difficulty complying with the 
structural norms of the workplace.  As stated above, in one study, the 
most requested accommodation by individuals with disabilities was a 
modification to their schedules.51  Although “part-time or modified 
work schedules” is listed as a possible accommodation in the statute,52 
employers often successfully argue that the accommodation does not 
have to be granted because the schedule or shift is an “essential 
function” of the job.53 
For instance, in one case, the plaintiff managed an AT&T store, 
and working more than forty hours per week exacerbated her MS 
symptoms.54  She asked for an accommodation to limit her work 
schedule to no more than forty hours per week but her employer 
refused, stating that being able to work more than forty hours per week 
was an essential function of the store manager position.55  Similarly, in 
another case, the plaintiff was a systems engineer who worked between 
sixty to eighty hours per week.56  After he was diagnosed with hepatitis 
C, he requested an accommodation that would allow him to reduce his 
hours to forty hours per week so he could get adequate rest and reduce 
his stress level.57  Although the employer temporarily accommodated 
him, it refused to accommodate him on an ongoing basis, arguing that 
it could not continue to do so without hiring additional staff, thus 
making the accommodation unreasonable.58  The court agreed with 
the employer and held that working overtime was an essential function 
 
 48  Porter, Synergistic Solutions, supra note 38, at 785–86.  
 49  Upton v. JWP Businessland, 682 N.E.2d 1357 (Mass. 1997). 
 50  Porter, Synergistic Solutions, supra note 38, at 787–88.  
 51  Schur et al., supra note 18, at 601.  
 52  42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B) (2008).  
 53  See Michelle A. Travis, Recapturing the Transformative Potential of Employment 
Discrimination Law, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3, 62 (2005) (criticizing this practice by 
employers and courts).  
 54  EEOC v. AT&T Mobility Servs. LLC, No. 10-13889, 2011 WL 6309449, at *2 
(E.D. Mich. Dec. 15, 2011). 
 55  Id. at *3–4. 
 56  Davis v. Microsoft Corp., 37 P.3d 333, 335 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002), aff’d, 70 P.3d 
126 (Wash. 2003). 
 57  Id.  
 58  Id.  
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of the job and the employer was not obligated to accommodate the 
plaintiff.59  Other scholars have commented on this phenomenon, 
where employers refuse to provide accommodations for the structural 
norms of the workplace.60 
In a recent work, I explored many cases where the plaintiff 
unsuccessfully sought an accommodation to one of the structural 
norms of the workplace after the ADA Amendments Act (“ADAAA”).61  
Many of these cases involved shifts and schedules.  For instance, in 
Tucker v. Missouri Dept. of Social Services, the plaintiff could not work the 
night shift because of the effects of his migraine medicine, and he was 
fired from his job.62  The court held that he was not qualified because 
working all shifts was an essential function of the job.63 
Similarly, in Azzam v. Baptist Healthcare Affiliates, a registered nurse 
sought light duty, no nights, no weekends, and five-hour workdays after 
she suffered a stroke.64  The court held that the plaintiff was not a 
qualified individual, deferring to the employer’s argument that all 
nurses must rotate being on call at night and on the weekends to 
provide health care in emergency situations.65 
In another case involving rotating shifts, the plaintiff requested a 
permanent eight-hour day shift schedule following a surgery.66  The 
plaintiff was employed as a resource coordinator and that position was 
scheduled to work rotating shifts in order to provide twenty-four-hour 
customer service.67  The employer denied plaintiff’s request for a 
permanent day shift, arguing that working rotating shifts was an 
 
 59  Id. at 337.  
 60  See generally CATHERINE R. ALBISTON, INSTITUTIONAL INEQUALITY AND THE 
MOBILIZATION OF THE FAMILY & MEDICAL LEAVE ACT: RIGHTS ON LEAVE 67 (Cambridge 
Univ. Press 2010) (stating that despite specific language in the ADA allowing for 
accommodations regarding schedules, courts often reject as unreasonable any 
accommodations that might modify “institutionalized time standards” without looking 
at whether they can be accomplished easily); Travis, supra note 53, at 24–36 (discussing 
cases where courts held that full-time schedules, excessive hours, mandatory overtime, 
being present at work (rather than working from home), set starting and ending times, 
and regular attendance are all essential functions of the job).  
 61  Porter, Backlash, supra note 13, at 73–78.  This discussion is derived in significant 
part from this work. 
 62  Tucker v. Mo. Dep’t. of Soc. Servs., No. 2:11-CV-04134-NKL, 2012 WL 6115604, 
at *1 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 10, 2012). 
 63  Id. at *4, *6. 
 64  Azzam v. Baptist Healthcare Affiliates, Inc., 855 F. Supp. 2d 653, 655–56 (W.D. 
Ky. 2012).  
 65  Id. at 661–62.  
 66  Kallail v. Alliant Energy Corp., 691 F.3d 925, 928 (8th Cir. 2012). 
 67  Id. at 927. 
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essential function of the job.  The court agreed.68 
One recent case dealt with the hours an employee works.  In White 
v. Standard Insurance Co., the court held that full-time employment was 
an essential function of the job, and therefore the plaintiff, whose back 
pain limited her ability to work more than four hours per day, was not 
qualified.69 
Several recent cases held that attendance is an essential function 
of the job.  One case stated that a business does not have to endure 
“erratic, unreliable attendance by its employees,” even when that 
conduct is due to an alleged disability, specifically depression, anxiety, 
and migraine headaches.70  Similarly, in Lewis v. New York City Police 
Department, the court found that the plaintiff’s absences because of her 
disability established that she was not a qualified individual.71 
Certainly, it makes sense for an employer to expect reliable 
attendance of its employees, including those employees who have a 
disability.  However, when an employee with a disability misses too 
much work, she often needs either to be able to work from home for a 
period of time, or she simply needs time to heal to get her medical 
issues resolved or under control.  Thus, the reliable attendance issue 
often coincides with working from home and leaves of absence as 
possible accommodations.72 
Although some employers allow both of these accommodations,73 
many more refuse them.74  In one particularly troubling case, the Court 
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the plaintiff was not 
qualified when she violated the employer’s very stringent attendance 
policy (allowing only eight absences per year) while she was 
experiencing numbness and weakness related to an eventual diagnosis 
of multiple sclerosis.75  Because she had not been employed for more 
than one year, she was not entitled to FMLA leave.76  The employer 
refused to give her leave even though it had a discretionary policy that 
allowed thirty days of leave in some circumstances.77  Because the court 
found that there was not any evidence that thirty days would be enough 
 
 68  Id. at 931. 
 69  White v. Standard Ins. Co., 529 F. App’x 547, 549–50 (6th Cir. 2013).  
 70  Brown v. Honda of Am., No. 2:10-CV-459, 2012 WL 4061795, at *4–6 (S.D. Ohio 
Sept. 14, 2012).  
 71  Lewis v. New York City Police Dep’t, 908 F. Supp. 2d 313, 326 (E.D.N.Y. 2012). 
 72  Porter, Backlash, supra note 13, at 76.  
 73  Id. at 73. 
 74  Id. at 76–77.  
 75  Basden v. Prof’l Transp., Inc., 714 F.3d 1034, 1036–37 (7th Cir. 2013).  
 76  Id. at 1039. 
 77  Id. at 1037. 
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time for plaintiff to recover enough to return to work, the court 
affirmed the district court’s grant of the defendant’s motion for 
summary judgment.78 
2. Physical Functions of the Job 
Obviously, some employees with disabilities have difficulty 
performing the physical functions of the job and therefore must seek 
accommodations.  As I have concluded in a study of recent cases 
brought under the ADA after it was amended in 2008, employers are 
more likely to grant accommodation requests when those requests seek 
a modification of the physical functions of the job (rather than a 
modification of the structural norms of the workplace),79 but there are 
still many cases where employers refuse to grant accommodations, 
often arguing that the physical task is an essential function of the job,80 
and therefore, there is no way of accommodating it without 
eliminating the function, which is not required under the ADA.81 
Although most workers with caregiving responsibilities do not 
have difficulty performing the physical tasks of the job, many pregnant 
workers do, and pregnancy is a form of caregiving.  Some pregnant 
women have complications with their pregnancies that cause their 
doctors to put restrictions on what they can do—usually involving 
lifting or other physically arduous functions of the job.82 
Thus, because both individuals with disabilities and workers with 
caregiving responsibilities have difficulty consistently meeting their 
employers’ expectations, they are forced to seek some type of 
accommodations or modifications of the job.  As I have argued 
elsewhere, doing so causes them to be subject to special treatment 
stigma. 
B. Special Treatment Stigma 
When employees seek accommodations in the workplace, they are 
often subject to special treatment stigma.  They are stigmatized by both 
their employers and their coworkers. 
 
 78  Id. 
 79  Porter, Backlash, supra note 13, at 67–70. 
 80  Id. at 65–66.  
 81  Porter, supra note 1, at 1108; Porter, Backlash, supra note 13, at 70.  
 82  See, e.g., Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338, 1344 (2015) (noting 
that the plaintiff’s doctor restricted her from lifting over 20 pounds for the first 20 
weeks of her pregnancy and over 10 pounds thereafter); Tysinger v. Police Dep’t of 
Zanesville, 463 F.3d 569, 571 (6th Cir. 2006) (noting that the plaintiff’s doctor put her 
on light duty from her job as a police officer after she was in an altercation with a 
suspect).  
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First, employers are often reluctant to accommodate workers if 
they do not believe that the law absolutely requires them to.  And when 
the law does require the employer to accommodate an employee, 
employers are sometimes more reluctant to hire or promote those 
individuals who need or are likely to need accommodations.  Second, 
employees who receive accommodations are stigmatized by their 
coworkers because their coworkers are resentful of the 
accommodations—either because those accommodations place 
burdens on the coworkers or because they are accommodations that 
the coworkers also covet.  I will elaborate on each of these in turn. 
1. Stigmatized by Employers83 
As I have explored elsewhere, despite having a legal obligation to 
accommodate individuals with disabilities (as compared to workers 
with caregiving responsibilities), employers often are reluctant to 
provide accommodations to individuals with disabilities.84  In fact, 
employers are often willing to provide informal accommodations to an 
employee until and unless the employee requests an accommodation 
that signals a possible legal obligation.85  For instance, in Serednyj v. 
Beverly Healthcare, LLC,86 in her attempt to prove that the employer 
discriminated against her because of her pregnancy, the plaintiff 
pointed to the fact that before her pregnancy, other employees assisted 
her in performing her more strenuous job duties, but after she became 
pregnant and asked for the same assistance, the employer refused.87  
The court stated that there was a material difference between 
requesting and receiving assistance from other employees and forcing 
those employees to give assistance if needed as an accommodation.88  
In the disability law context, I have described a similar phenomenon 
that I call “withdrawn accommodations.”89  Frequently, employers are 
willing to provide temporary modifications of job duties, but when the 
employee requests a permanent accommodation, the employer refuses 
 
 83  This sub-part is derived in significant part from a prior work.  See Porter, supra 
note 1, at 1109–11. 
 84  Porter, supra note 1, at 1109. 
 85  SAMUEL R. BAGENSTOS, LAW AND THE CONTRADICTIONS OF THE DISABILITY RIGHTS 
MOVEMENT 56 (2009) (“Disability rights advocates commonly charge that employers 
accommodate the needs of workers without disabilities all the time; in many cases, it is 
only when a disabled worker asks for accommodation that the employer balks.”).  
 86  Serednyj v. Beverly Healthcare, LLC, 656 F.3d 540 (7th Cir. 2011). 
 87  Id. at 549. 
 88  Id. 
 89  Nicole Buonocore Porter, Withdrawn Accommodations, 63 DRAKE L. REV. 885 
(2015).  
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and withdraws the accommodation.90 
Further evidence that employers dislike having to provide 
accommodations is the fact that the ADA has not noticeably improved 
the employment rate of individuals with disabilities.91  Many scholars 
have argued that the reason for this is because employers are resistant 
to providing accommodations to individuals with disabilities92 so 
employers simply do not hire those individuals.93  As most employment 
lawyers know, it is far easier for an employer to defend a failure to hire 
claim than it is to defend a termination claim.94  Therefore, anything 
that arguably increases the costs of employing an individual or makes 
it more difficult for an employer to fire an employee might incentivize 
an employer to not hire the individual in the first place.95 
2. Stigmatized by Coworkers96 
Coworkers resent employees who receive accommodations for 
two reasons.  First, they resent some accommodations that place 
burdens on the coworkers.  Second, coworkers resent accommodations 
that they wish they could have. 
Courts often reject accommodations if those accommodations 
require assistance from other employees.  For instance, in Meinen v. 
Godfrey Brake Service & Supply, Inc.,97 after the plaintiff was hospitalized 
and subsequently diagnosed with multiple sclerosis (MS),98 the 
company created two part-time positions to cover the parts department 
 
 90  Id. at 896–905.  
 91  BAGENSTOS, supra note 85, at 117 (stating that the ADA “has failed significantly 
to improve the employment position of people with disabilities”).  
 92  Cheryl L. Anderson, Ideological Dissonance, Disability Backlash, and the ADA 
Amendments Act, 55 WAYNE L. REV. 1267, 1308 (2009) (“It has . . . been suggested that 
the ADA has increased the difficulty for individuals with disabilities to obtain 
employment, because employers seek to avoid the obligations under the statute.”); 
Michelle A. Travis, Lashing Back at the ADA Backlash: How the Americans with Disabilities 
Act Benefits Americans Without Disabilities, 76 TENN. L. REV. 311, 315 (noting that 
“employers were initially the ADA’s primary opponents because of the concerns about 
the potential costs of accommodations”). 
 93  BAGENSTOS, supra note 85, at 117 (pointing to, but disagreeing with, some 
commentators who argue that the employment rates of individuals with disabilities 
declined because of the ADA). 
 94  Id. at 134. 
 95  Porter, supra note 1, at 1111. 
 96  This Part is derived from Porter, Stigma, supra note 26, at 236–39, and Porter, 
supra note 1, at 1111–15.  Because employers have a legal obligation to accommodate 
employees with disabilities, most of these cases demonstrating the resentment of 
coworkers are cases brought under the ADA. 
 97  Meinen v. Godfrey Brake Serv. & Supply, Inc., No. CIV. 10-5077-JLV, 2012 WL 
4364669 (D.S.D. Sept. 24, 2012).  
 98  Id. at *1.  
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(where plaintiff had worked) and to retain his position until he could 
return to work.99  When the plaintiff returned to work, he could not 
work more than four hours per day.100  The plaintiff’s supervisor 
testified that upon the plaintiff’s return, when he was still suffering 
from some vision loss caused by the MS, the plaintiff required a lot of 
help from other employees in seeing parts to determine what they 
were, finding parts in the catalog, and locating parts in the building.101  
The supervisor testified that “it bothered him that other employees 
had to help [the plaintiff] because it was taking time away from other 
things that needed to be done.”102  When the defendant terminated the 
plaintiff, the supervisor stated that a full-time employee would be 
preferable because the plaintiff required so much help that took away 
from other employees’ time.103  When the plaintiff’s wife went into the 
workplace to collect plaintiff’s check, she asked the owner whether 
there was anything that her husband could do to keep his job.104  He 
replied in the negative, stating that the plaintiff “was too slow and that 
he couldn’t have his other employees wasting their time helping” the 
plaintiff.105  The court held that creation of a part-time position is not 
a reasonable accommodation and that simply allowing the plaintiff to 
work a part-time position for a period of time does not obligate the 
employer to continue to provide the accommodation.106  More 
importantly for our purposes here, the court also held that the 
employer was not required to continue to provide the plaintiff with 
assistance from other employees in performing the essential 
functions.107 
In a similar case, Lopez v. Tyler Refrigeration Corp.,108 the plaintiff 
suffered an injury at work that led to permanent restrictions, including 
an inability to lift objects over twenty-five pounds and only occasional 
 
 99  Id. at *2.  
 100  Id. at *1 n.3. 
 101  Id. at *3.  
 102  Id. 
 103  Meinen, 2012 WL4364669, at *3. 
 104  Id. 
 105  Id. 
 106  Id. at *10.  I find it interesting (and somewhat infuriating) that even though the 
ADA lists “part-time or modified work schedules” as possible reasonable 
accommodations, courts easily ignore this by stating that the accommodation 
requested is not a modification to the current position, but rather is the creation of an 
entirely new part-time position.  Id. at *8–9. 
 107  Id. at *13. 
 108  Lopez v. Tyler Refrigerator Corp., No. 99-10637, 2000 WL 122387 (5th Cir. Jan. 
4, 2000) (per curiam). 
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use of hand tools for no more than two hours daily.109  After allowing 
the plaintiff to work around his restrictions for a short period of time, 
the employer fired him because his restrictions would never allow him 
to return to his regular assembler position.110  The plaintiff’s supervisor 
testified that when he created a temporary modified job for the 
plaintiff, the more strenuous aspects of the job were given to other 
employees so that the plaintiff could work on the easier functions.111  
In holding that the plaintiff was not qualified to perform the essential 
functions of the position, the court stated that it was “unreasonable” to 
modify the job permanently to meet the plaintiff’s restrictions because 
it forced other employees to perform the heavy lifting of the job.112 
Some cases more explicitly demonstrate coworkers’ resistance to 
accommodations that arguably make other employees work harder or 
longer.113  For instance, in Petrosky v. New York State Department of Motor 
Vehicles,114 the plaintiff suffered stigma and resentment when she was 
diagnosed with Type II diabetes and was required to take regular 
breaks to eat and manage her condition properly.115  Although she 
requested a lighter workload, she was given a heavier load after her 
diabetes diagnosis, which sometimes caused her to be unable to take 
the breaks she needed to properly manage her diabetes.116  The facts 
indicate that she was the “subject of derogatory comments and 
complaints from co-workers who contended that they were required to 
do more work” because of her illness.117  In addition, when she 
requested reduced hours, two of her supervisors complained about her 
request.118  Although the plaintiff ultimately survived summary 
judgment, this case demonstrates the type of bias employees face when 
they ask for accommodations in the workplace.119 
 
 109  Id. at *1. 
 110  Id. 
 111  Id. at *2. 
 112  Id. at *3. 
 113  See, e.g., Rehrs v. Iams Co., 486 F.3d 353, 357 (8th Cir. 2007) (indicating it is 
unreasonable to accommodate a disabled employee if doing so would require other 
employees to work harder or longer); Milton v. Scrivner, Inc., 53 F.3d 1118, 1124–25 
(10th Cir. 1995) (“An accommodation that would result in other employees having to 
work[] harder or longer hours is not required.”).  
 114  Petrovsky v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 72 F. Supp. 2d 39 (N.D.N.Y. 
1999). 
 115  Id. at 46.  
 116  Id. 
 117  Id.  
 118  Id.  
 119  Id. at 60 (“The record reflects that Petrosky’s supervisors and coworkers were 
upset by realignments made in the work schedule to accommodate Petrosky.”). 
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Modifications to the structural norms of the workplace for an 
individual with a disability can also place burdens on coworkers.  For 
instance, a commonly requested accommodation is a waiver of the 
requirement to work rotating shifts.  Many employers who operate 
around the clock utilize rotating shifts, but if an individual has a 
disability that precludes him from working rotating shifts, the easiest 
way for an employer to accommodate this request is to require other 
employees to rotate through the less desirable shifts more often.120  The 
courts are almost uniform in holding that an employer does not have 
to allow an employee with a disability to have a waiver of the rotating 
shifts requirement as an accommodation.121  And in so holding, the 
courts use rhetoric indicating that they are concerned about placing 
burdens on the coworkers of the individual with a disability. 
For instance, in Bogner v. Wackenhut Corp.,122 the plaintiff, who had 
epilepsy and suffered from occasional seizures, asked to work only the 
day shift because his doctor believed that it would limit the recurrence 
of his seizures.123  In holding that rotating shifts were an essential 
function of the job, and therefore, it was unreasonable to allow the 
plaintiff to avoid working rotating shifts as an accommodation, the 
court stated that the accommodation was not reasonable because it 
would impose “an additional burden on Bogner’s co-workers.”124 
In another case, the plaintiff had Type I diabetes and related 
complications.125  The plaintiff worked as a resource coordinator, and 
her employer required all resource coordinators to work rotating 
shifts, rotating between twelve-hour and eight-hour shifts and between 
day and night shifts.126  Because of the difficulties associated with 
managing her diabetes, the plaintiff’s doctor advised her to work a 
 
 120  Porter, Stigma, supra note 26, at 245–47.  But see id. at 244–45 (discussing a real 
life scenario I dealt with in practice where the employer allowed itself to overstaff on 
the day shift (which the disabled employee needed) and understaff on the afternoon 
or night shifts to avoid placing the burden on other employees of rotating through the 
less desirable shifts more often).  
 121  Porter, Stigma, supra note 26, at 245–47 (discussing cases).  However, I have 
found one case where the court held that the employer should have granted the 
plaintiff’s request to only work the day shift and not the graveyard shift, because the 
graveyard shift exacerbated plaintiff’s insomnia, migraine headaches, and depression.  
Maes v. City of Espanola, No. 1:12-CV-01250, 2014 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36154 
(D.N.M. Jan. 13, 2014). 
 122  Bogner v. Wackenhut Corp., No. 05-CV-6171, 2008 WL 84590 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 
2008). 
 123  Id. at *1–2. 
 124  Id. at *6.  
 125  Kallail v. Alliant Energy Corp. Servs., 691 F.3d 925, 928 (8th Cir. 2012). 
 126  Id. at 927. 
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straight day shift.127  Apparently, the rotating shift was causing her to 
experience erratic changes in her blood pressure and blood sugar and 
was putting her at higher risk of diabetic complications, including 
death.128  The plaintiff appealed from the district court’s grant of 
summary judgment in favor of the defendant, arguing that the court 
erred in finding that working rotating shifts was an essential function 
of the position.129  The court stated that shift rotation enhances the 
non-work life of the other employees by spreading the less desirable 
shifts among all of the employees.  If the plaintiff were allowed to work 
a straight day shift, other employees would have to work more night 
and weekend shifts.130  In fact, the employer had considered adding a 
couple of straight-shift positions, but it abandoned the idea because 
other employees complained.131 
Similarly, in Dicksey v. New Hanover Sheriff’s Department, the 
plaintiff, who had a seizure disorder, was transferred to a job working 
rotating shifts.132  His doctor advised that he would be better able to 
control his seizure disorder if he worked a straight shift.133  The day 
after he requested a straight shift as an accommodation for his 
disability, he was terminated.134  In holding that the employer should 
not have to reallocate essential functions of the job (working a rotating 
shift), the court used the often-stated rule that any accommodation 
that makes other employees work harder or longer is unreasonable.135  
The court also stated: “Assigning plaintiff to the day shift on an 
indefinite basis would have placed upon plaintiff’s coworkers or his 
boss the burden of working plaintiff’s night shifts.”136 
Finally, in Rehrs v. Iams Co., the plaintiff, who suffered from Type 
I diabetes, began having trouble managing his diabetes when his 
company implemented a rotating-shift schedule for all warehouse 
workers.137  His doctor requested that he be placed on a fixed daytime 
schedule in order to better control his diabetes, and although he was 
allowed to work that schedule for a period of time, the employer 
 
 127  Id. at 928. 
 128  Id. 
 129  Id. at 930. 
 130  Id. at 931. 
 131  Kallail, 691 F.3d at 931. 
 132  Dicksey v. New Hanover Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 522 F. Supp. 2d 742, 744–45 
(E.D.N.C. 2007).  
 133  Id. at 745. 
 134  Id. 
 135  Id. at 748–49. 
 136  Id. at 749.  
 137  Rehrs v. Iams Co., 486 F.3d 353, 354–55 (8th Cir. 2007). 
PORTER (DO NOT DELETE) 11/3/2016  1:17 PM 
2016] ACCOMMODATING EVERYONE 103 
eventually withdrew this accommodation and put him on short-term 
disability leave.138  When defending the lawsuit, the employer argued 
that not enforcing the shift rotation would “adversely affect other 
technicians, creating inequities, because these other technicians would 
be forced to work the night shift exclusively or for longer periods and 
lose the benefits of shift rotation, thereby decreasing their 
opportunities for promotion and development.”139 
In addition to rotating shifts, courts sometimes find that leaves of 
absence and working from home accommodations place burdens on 
other employees.  For instance, in Mason v. Avaya Communications, Inc., 
the court held that the plaintiff’s request for an accommodation to 
allow her to work at home was unreasonable.140  The plaintiff worked 
as a service coordinator, which required her to schedule service 
appointments for technicians working in the field.141  After a horrific 
workplace violence scare, the plaintiff learned that the threatening 
employee was going to return to work, and she became sick, suffering 
from post-traumatic stress disorder.142  Accordingly, she asked for 
several accommodations, including relocating the threatening 
employee, allowing her to work at another facility, and allowing her to 
work from home.143  The employer denied these requests.144  In 
determining whether working from home was a reasonable 
accommodation, the court deferred to the employer’s assertion that 
teamwork was an essential function of the coordinator position 
because the coordinators assisted and covered for one another.145  The 
court stated that the plaintiff’s “suggestion that teamwork is not an 
essential function because other service coordinators can pick up the 
slack in her stead is simply irrelevant in determining whether 
teamwork is an essential function of the job.”146 
In a similar case, the plaintiff needed to miss work intermittently 
because she had several disabilities.147  Her supervisor began 
questioning her about her frequent absences and told her that every 
 
 138  Id. at 355. 
 139  Id. at 357.  
 140  Mason v. Avaya Commc’ns, Inc., 357 F.3d 1114, 1116 (10th Cir. 2004).  
 141  Id. at 1117.  
 142  Id.  
 143  Id. 
 144  Id. at 1117–18. 
 145  Id. at 1121. 
 146  Mason, 357 F.3d at 1121. 
 147  Zimmerman v. Gruma Corp., No. 3:11-CV-01990-L, 2013 WL 3154118, at *1–2 
(N.D. Tex. June 21, 2013).  
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time she was not at work, she placed a burden on her coworkers.148  The 
plaintiff claimed that she received “ongoing harassment” because of 
her absences.149 
The cases above addressed the situation where a coworker resents 
an accommodation because the accommodation places burdens on 
other employees.  The second reason coworkers might be resentful of 
an accommodation is if they see the accommodation as providing 
preferential treatment to the individual with a disability.  In other 
words, coworkers are resentful when some employees receive 
accommodations that the coworkers covet.150  This resentment also 
leads some employers to not want to grant the accommodation, for 
fear of the backlash they might receive from granting what looks like 
“special treatment” or because they are worried about the precedent-
setting effect of granting some accommodations.151 
For instance, in Hancock v. Washington Hospital Center, the court 
considered whether an employer should have to give the plaintiff an 
accommodation that could be seen as preferential treatment.152  The 
plaintiff was a medical assistant whose responsibilities included, among 
other things, quite a bit of walking and lifting.153  After complications 
related to a surgery to remove cysts, the plaintiff was under doctor’s 
instructions that limited her ability to lift and walk.154  One of the 
possible accommodations discussed was to allow her a light duty 
position of answering the telephones.155  The plaintiff’s supervisor 
balked at this request stating: “If I only utilize her on the phones (long-
term), then it sets me up to have to make likewise accommodations for 
other staff members in the future.”156 
Similarly, in Lee v. Harrah’s New Orleans, the plaintiff was a dealer 
in a casino and suffered from severe back pain and fibromyalgia, which 
limited her ability to stand for long periods of time.157  Plaintiff’s 
position required her to stand most of the time, but another position, 
the box person assignment, was mostly a sitting position.  The plaintiff 
 
 148  Id. at *2. 
 149  Id. 
 150  Porter, Stigma, supra note 26, at 249–51. 
 151  Id. at 249. 
 152  Hancock v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 908 F. Supp. 2d 18, 19 (D.D.C. 2012), aff’d, 
618 F. App’x 4 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
 153  Id. at 20. 
 154  Id. at 20–21. 
 155  Id. at 22. 
 156  Id.  
 157  Lee v. Harrah’s New Orleans, No. 11-570, 2013 WL 3899895, at *1 (E.D. La. July 
29, 2013). 
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requested to be assigned to the box person position as an 
accommodation for her disability.158  She sued when the employer 
refused to assign her permanently to that position.  Her supervisor 
testified that he tried to assign her to the seated position as much as 
possible without showing favoritism.159 
Finally, the accommodation that might cause the most 
resentment by other employees involves reassignment to another 
position.  If the employee can no longer perform the essential 
functions of his current position, the employee might request 
“reassignment to a vacant position,” which is an accommodation 
specifically referenced in the ADA.160  As I have discussed elsewhere, 
there is a circuit split in the courts regarding whether an employer has 
to reassign an employee with a disability if another, more qualified 
employee also applies for the vacant position.161  It is not difficult to 
imagine how other employees might be resentful of an employee with 
a disability if that employee gets a coveted position over the more-
qualified, non-disabled coworker. 
Because employers are legally obligated to accommodate 
individuals with disabilities, we see much more evidence of the 
resentment of coworkers when accommodations are given to 
individuals with disabilities.  With the exception of providing leave 
under the FMLA to eligible employees, employers are not legally 
obligated to accommodate workers with caregiving responsibilities.162  
Nevertheless, sometimes employers do accommodate caregivers.  And 
when they do, those caregivers experience the same type of resentment 
that individuals with disabilities do.163  As I have discussed elsewhere, 
other scholars have argued that accommodating caregivers is likely to 
create tensions between those caregivers and their coworkers:164 
 
 158  Id. at *2, *4–5. 
 159  Id. at *2. 
 160  42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B) (2008).  
 161  Porter, Stigma, supra note 26, at 250–51 (comparing EEOC v. United Airlines, 
Inc., 693 F.3d 760, 761 (7th Cir. 2012) with Huber v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 486 F.3d 
480 (8th Cir. 2007)).  
 162  Porter, supra note 1, at 1117–18.  In some cases, however, employers might be 
legally obligated to accommodate pregnant workers.  See Young v. United Parcel Serv., 
Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338 (2015).  
 163  JOAN C. WILLIAMS, RESHAPING THE WORK-FAMILY DEBATE: WHY MEN AND CLASS 
MATTER 35 (2010) (stating that when employers provide paid leave, they often burden 
other employees, causing resentment).  
 164  Porter, supra note 1, at 1114; see also Michelle Travis, Equality in the Virtual 
Workplace, 24 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 283, 329 (2003) (stating that when employers 
change the rule for some but not all employees, this may “contribute to coworkers’ 
resentment and the feeling that accommodations represent bare preferential 
treatment or affirmative action rather than a form of equal opportunity.”). 
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The argument is that accommodating caregivers bestows 
undue privileges on parents, yet holds nonparents to higher 
performance standards. Many studies indicate that employees 
without primary caregiving responsibilities express a desire to 
work fewer hours like their caregiving counterparts and 
express resentment that only the caregiving employees are 
allowed the opportunity to work reduced hours. Many of us 
have also heard anecdotal stories regarding coworkers’ 
resentment when workers with caregiving responsibilities must 
leave work early or are not expected to come in on the 
weekends, leaving the non-caregivers to pick up the slack for 
their caregiving coworkers.165 
This resentment was recently discussed by Professor Trina 
Jones.166  She argues that the extension of flexibility and benefits to 
some workers, when all workers experience difficulty balancing work 
and life, has created a “tipping point,” causing single workers to 
question the fairness of the load they are carrying.167  Specifically, she 
argues that when companies try to appear family friendly, they 
pressure single workers to travel more, work more weekends and 
holidays, stay later during the week, and refrain from taking time off.168  
Moreover, these companies often do not compensate for or treat single 
workers better because of this extra work.169  She also argues that 
parents get benefits that non-parents do not get but wish they could.170  
Thus, Jones argues that this causes childfree workers to feel resentful 
of the benefits given to working parents.171 
C. My Prior Attempt to Ameliorate Special Treatment Stigma 
Because individuals with disabilities and employees with 
caregiving responsibilities are likely to suffer stigma flowing from both 
employers and employees, I have spent quite some time trying to figure 
out how to ameliorate the effects of “special treatment stigma.”  In 
prior work, I acknowledged that special treatment stigma was 
inevitable and unavoidable unless we could change the minds of those 
 
 165  Porter, supra note 1, at 114 (footnotes and citations omitted). 
 166  Trina Jones, Single and Childfree! Reassessing Parental and Marital Status 
Discrimination, 46 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1253 (2014). 
 167  Id. at 1265.  
 168  Id. at 1266.  
 169  Id. at 1269–71. 
 170  Id. at 1329.  Jones is referring to benefits such as tuition assistance for an 
employee’s children, part-time or other reduced hour schedules, and flexible leave 
policies. 
 171  Id. at 1255–56. 
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who resented the accommodations given to individuals with disabilities 
and sometimes to caregivers.172  In order to effect that culture shift, I 
relied on communitarian theory.173 
Specifically, I argued that if we focus on the workplace as a 
community, and if we understand the advantages of working together 
within the workplace community for the mutual benefit of all 
employees (and the employer), we will have a better appreciation for 
why accommodating both individuals with disabilities and caregivers is 
appropriate and warranted.174  After explaining the basic tenets of 
communitarian theory,175 I argued that this theory supported providing 
accommodations to individuals with disabilities and caregivers.176  I 
argued that the resentment coworkers feel towards individuals who 
receive some type of special benefits in the workplace is evidence of an 
overemphasis on individual rights.177  “Instead, if we all view the 
workplace as a community and understood ourselves as having a 
responsibility to others in our community,” the resentment coworkers 
feel about accommodations would dissipate.178 
Furthermore, I argued that the workplace community benefits in 
several ways from providing individuals with accommodations.179  First, 
accommodating workers allows them to remain employed, thereby 
reducing the considerable costs of attrition and turnover.180  Second, 
society benefits when employers provide accommodations to 
individuals with disabilities and caregivers because increasing the 
employment opportunities for these groups reduces the chance that 
they will rely on public assistance.181  Third, relying in large part on the 
important work of Professor Travis, I argued that the ADA benefits 
nondisabled employees in addition to helping disabled employees.182  
Finally, I argued that accommodating caregivers also benefits non-
caregivers.183  I pointed out that caregiving is inevitable.  All of us, at 
 
 172  Porter, supra note 1, at 1139–40. 
 173  Id. at 1139–52. 
 174  Id. at 1140. 
 175  These tenets include the departure from a preoccupation with rights and an 
emphasis on the responsibility we owe to others within our communities.  Porter, Why 
Care, supra note 4, at 394. 
 176  Porter, supra note 1, at 1142. 
 177  Id. 
 178  Id. 
 179  Id. at 1142–43. 
 180  Id. at 1142. 
 181  Id. at 1143. 
 182  Porter, supra note 1, at 1143–47. 
 183  Id. at 1148–51. 
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one point or another, will either find ourselves in a caregiving role or 
will be in need of care.184  This is true even for those who do not ever 
have children.185  I also argued that parents and other caregivers have 
a moral obligation to attend to the proper care of their children or 
others who are dependent on them, and that society as a whole 
(including non-caregivers) benefits when caregivers are given the tools 
needed to provide this care.186  Thus, I argued, the communitarian 
theory supports providing accommodations to caregivers in the same 
way we accommodate individuals with disabilities.187 
I still believe this to be true.  I continue to believe that if employees 
and employers would stop considering only their own interests and 
would begin to see the benefits of working together in our workplace 
communities, we could begin to eliminate the special treatment stigma 
that accompanies accommodations in the workplace.  But I recognize 
this is quite a utopian position for me to take.  With all of the emphasis 
on individual merit, seniority, and competition in the workplace, in 
addition to the sense of insecurity felt by many American workers, my 
proposal to see the workplace as a community, where employees 
support one another for the good of the community, will likely not 
gain much traction.  I accordingly suggest a compromise—a pragmatic 
alternative to my more lofty goal of ending special treatment by 
attacking it directly.  I propose a universal accommodation mandate so 
that there will no longer be any “special treatment” that can be 
stigmatized. 
III. ELIMINATING SPECIAL TREATMENT STIGMA BY ACCOMMODATING 
EVERYONE 
In order to eliminate the special treatment stigma suffered by 
individuals with disabilities and workers with caregiving 
responsibilities, this Part will propose and justify a universal 
accommodation mandate.  The idea of a universal accommodation 
mandate is simple: any employee has the right to request a workplace 
accommodation and the employer cannot refuse the request based on 
the reason for the request.  The employer would, of course, be able to 
 
 184  Id. at 1148. 
 185  Id. (pointing out that everyone could be forced into a caregiving role by being 
called upon to provide care for a sick or disabled spouse, partner, parent, or other 
family member).  
 186  Id. at 1149–50.  But see Jones, supra note 166, at 1300 (arguing that, “while 
parenting is important, the critical nature of this function alone is insufficient to 
explain why [child free employees], who are doing the same work as parents within 
the workplace, are required to indirectly subsidize parenting.”).  
 187  Id. at 1150. 
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reject the request if the accommodation was unreasonable or if it 
would cause an undue hardship.  Otherwise, the employer must 
provide the accommodation. 
A. My Prior Consideration of a Universal Accommodation Mandate 
In prior work, I considered, but ultimately rejected, the idea of a 
universal accommodation mandate.188  My main concern was over the 
difficulty in implementing such a broad mandate; specifically, I 
became fixated on the idea that the employee requesting an 
accommodation would have to prove that he needs the 
accommodation.189  I found delineating the boundaries of “needs” to 
be difficult.  Is “need” based on the employee’s subjective perception 
or an objective inquiry?190  For instance, imagine an employee is 
training for a marathon in the winter and wants flex-time throughout 
the winter (arriving earlier in the morning and leaving earlier in the 
afternoon) in order to get home for training runs while it is still light 
outside.  Does this marathon-training employee need the 
accommodation?191  Or as another example, imagine an employee asks 
to be excused from some of the cleaning tasks required of the job at 
the end of the day because the cleaning materials irritate her, but not 
to the point where her sensitivity would qualify as a disability under the 
ADA.  Does this employee need this accommodation?192  In both cases, 
the individual employee might respond in the affirmative—she does 
need the accommodation.  And yet, the employers in both of these 
situations are likely to disagree. 
B. The New Universal Accommodation Mandate 
This proposal picks up where the last proposal ended (and 
 
 188  Porter, supra note 1, at 1133–38. 
 189  The fixation on determining if someone needs an accommodation makes some 
sense.  It makes sense because, generally, when individuals with disabilities request 
accommodations, it is because they cannot perform the essential functions of the job 
without an accommodation.  The ADA, however, also requires employers to provide 
accommodations to individuals with disabilities if that accommodation would allow the 
employee to enjoy the privileges or benefits offered by the employer.  EEOC 
ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE: REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION AND UNDUE HARDSHIP UNDER 
THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT, No. 915.002 (Oct. 17, 2002) (unpaginated), 
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/accommodation.html.  Thus, if an employer hosts 
a holiday party for its employees, and one of the employees uses a wheelchair, the 
employer should make sure that the location of the party is accessible for the employee 
who uses a wheelchair.  
 190  Porter, supra note 1, at 1136. 
 191  Id. 
 192  Id. 
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hopefully, this proposal succeeds where the last one failed).  Although 
defining “needs” is still difficult, this proposal covers accommodations 
beyond those that are strictly necessary in order to allow the employee 
to perform the functions of the position.  This is because I believe that 
if an accommodation mandate only covered accommodations needed 
by an employee in order to perform his job, there would be many 
accommodations that would not be granted.  A large subset of those 
would be accommodations requested by caregivers because many 
caregiving accommodations, such as reduced or modified hours, or 
time off for various child-related activities, would not be seen as strictly 
necessary in order to perform the functions of the job.  Furthermore, 
if a universal accommodation mandate covered only necessary 
accommodations, the stigma suffered by those groups of employees 
who are accommodated would continue. 
At the same time, I do not suggest a universal accommodation 
mandate should accommodate all requests equally.  The pushback 
from employers for such a proposal would be substantial.  Moreover, 
many of those who advocate on behalf of individuals with disabilities 
or caregivers might be worried about the dilution effect193—that giving 
someone running a marathon the same right to an accommodation as 
someone who has a caregiving conflict or needs flextime to 
accommodate medical appointments for a disability will dilute the 
effectiveness of the rights given to protected groups. 
As a compromise between these two competing views, I propose a 
universal accommodation mandate with a two-tier undue hardship 
analysis.  This two-tier undue hardship analysis would work as follows.  
For all accommodations that are necessary either because the 
employee cannot perform the job without it (for any reason, not just 
because of a disability) or because the employee would be neglecting 
unavoidable caregiving obligations without it, this proposal would 
apply the more stringent undue hardship standard borrowed from the 
ADA—defined as “significant difficulty or expense.”194  For all other 
accommodations requested, the undue hardship standard that would 
apply would be the more relaxed standard borrowed from the religious 
accommodation context, where anything more than a de minimis 
expense would constitute an undue hardship.195  Below I discuss how 
this proposal would apply to various accommodation requests. 
 
 193  I will discuss the dilution effect in more detail below.  See infra Part IV.C. 
 194  42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(A) (2008).  
 195  See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977).  
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C. Application of the Universal Accommodation Mandate 
This universal accommodation mandate would apply to both the 
physical functions of the job and to the structural norms of the 
workplace.  And, as noted above, it would cover accommodations that 
are not strictly “necessary.”  This feature is one thing that makes this 
proposal different from other universal accommodation proposals.  
For instance, in Accommodating Every Body, four disability scholars 
propose accommodating every “work-capable” individual for whom 
the “provision of reasonable accommodation is necessary to give 
meaningful access to enable their ability to work.”196  The authors 
emphasize that not every desire for an accommodation, even when that 
accommodation would be effective, would result in an entitlement.197  
The proposed accommodation would have to be “necessary for an 
individual to fulfill essential job functions.”198  My proposal is broader, 
covering not just necessary accommodations but also everything else. 
1. Necessary Accommodations 
I classify “necessary accommodations” as encompassing two 
things.  First, an accommodation is necessary if an employee cannot 
perform the essential functions of the job without it.  Second, an 
accommodation is necessary if the employee would be neglecting 
unavoidable caregiving obligations without it. 
a. Individuals with Disabilities 
Many individuals with disabilities need accommodations in order 
to perform the essential functions of their jobs.  And because 
individuals with disabilities are already entitled to an accommodation 
under the ADA,199 the status quo would not change for most of them 
under my proposal.  But because employers cannot scrutinize the 
reason for the accommodation, employees would not need to first 
prove that they have a disability as defined under the ADA.  Rather, 
the employees would have to demonstrate to their employer only that 
they have a physical limitation that makes it impossible for them to 
perform the essential function of the job without an accommodation. 
The one area where my proposal might differ from current law 
under the ADA is with regards to accommodations that are not strictly 
necessary in order to perform the functions of the job.  This situation 
 
 196  Stein et al., supra note 20, at 693. 
 197  Id. 
 198  Id. 
 199  42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2012). 
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might arise if an employee requests an accommodation that allows the 
employee to enjoy the privileges or benefits of a particular workplace.  
As stated in an enforcement guidance by the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC),200 the ADA “requires employers to 
provide reasonable accommodations so that employees with 
disabilities can enjoy the ‘benefits and privileges of employment’ equal 
to those enjoyed by similarly-situated employees without disabilities.”201  
These might include services such as employee assistance programs; 
credit unions, cafeterias, lounges, gymnasiums, and auditoriums; 
transportation; and parties or other social functions.202  These benefits 
and privileges of employment might not be “necessary” for an 
employee to perform the essential functions of the job. 
I am conflicted about how to deal with this.  Under my proposal, 
these accommodation requests would be subject to the less stringent 
“undue hardship” standard because they would not be strictly 
necessary.  And yet these accommodation requests are important for 
the full integration of individuals with disabilities into the workplace.203  
One factor that might mitigate the harm of this result is the fact that 
some courts have denied such accommodations under the ADA using 
a cost/benefit analysis.  For instance, in Vande Zande v. Wisconsin 
Department of Administration,204 the court held that the employer did not 
have to provide a lowered sink in the break room so that the plaintiff, 
who used a wheelchair, could reach the sink.  The evidence provided 
that lowering the sink would cost only $150, which would clearly not 
be unduly expensive.205  However, the court stated: 
Given the proximity of the bathroom sink, Vande Zande can 
hardly complain that the inaccessibility of the kitchenette sink 
interfered with her ability to work or with her physical comfort. 
Her argument rather is that forcing her to use the bathroom 
sink for activities (such as washing out her coffee cup) for 
which the other employees could use the kitchenette sink 
stigmatized her as different or inferior . . . . But we do not think 
an employer has a duty to expend even modest amounts of 
money to bring about an absolute identity in working 
 
 200  EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE: REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION AND UNDUE 
HARDSHIP UNDER THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT, No. 915.002 (Oct. 17, 2002) 
(unpaginated), http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/accommodation.html. 
 201  See id.  
 202  See id. 
 203  See Stein et al., supra note 20, at 744–49 (discussing the importance of 
integration of individuals with disabilities). 
 204  Vande Zande v. Wis. Dep’t of Admin., 44 F.3d 538 (7th Cir. 1995). 
 205  Id. at 546.  
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conditions between disabled and non-disabled workers. The 
creation of such a duty would be the inevitable consequence of 
deeming a failure to achieve identical conditions 
“stigmatizing.” That is merely an epithet. We conclude that 
access to a particular sink, when an access to an equivalent sink, 
conveniently located, is provided, is not a legal duty of an 
employer.206 
Thus, even though the ADA currently requires employers to 
accommodate privileges and benefits of employment (rather than only 
those accommodations that are necessary for the employee to perform 
the essential functions of the job), courts often find ways to deny those 
accommodations.207  I say this not to excuse those decisions (because I 
think these accommodations should be given) but to point out that my 
proposal is unlikely to cause a significant departure from the current 
state of affairs. 
b. Older Workers 
As discussed in the Accommodating Every Body article mentioned 
above,208 as increasingly more individuals want or need to continue 
working later in life, many will end up having impairments that affect 
their ability to perform some of the functions of the job, especially if 
the job is physically arduous.209  While many of these individuals might 
also be considered individuals with disabilities—especially after the 
expansion of the definition of disability in the ADA Amendments 
Act210—some might have pain or limitations that do not rise to the level 
of a disability.211  Furthermore, forcing older individuals to claim and 
argue that they should be considered an individual with a disability will 
lead to many of them choosing not to seek accommodations.212 
My proposal will not require these older individuals to prove that 
 
 206  Id.  
 207  See, e.g., id. 
 208  See generally Stein et al., supra note 20. 
 209  Id. at 703, 708. 
 210  See generally Porter, Backlash, supra note 13, at 46–47 (pointing to the numerous 
cases where courts adopted a much broader definition of disability under the ADA 
after the ADA Amendments Act).  
 211  Furthermore, there is some doubt about the effectiveness of the ADA 
Amendments Act in changing the judiciary’s opinion about the proper scope of 
disability protections.  Stein et al., supra note 20, at 699.  
 212  Id. at 708 (“Impaired individuals’ reluctance to request an accommodation may 
be driven by questions regarding whether they have a legally defined ‘disability,’ the 
desire to avoid the perception that they are getting ‘special’ treatment, an inhospitable 
workplace culture, fears of retaliation, and/or the incentive to pursue SSDI benefits 
instead of pursuing work.”).  
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they belong to the class of individuals protected under the ADA.  
Instead, as long as an accommodation is needed to allow the older 
employee to perform the essential functions of the job, the 
accommodation would have to be granted. 
In addition to older workers who might have restrictions on their 
ability to perform some workplace tasks, some workers who are smaller 
than the average person might also have difficulty performing some 
tasks and therefore might need an accommodation in order to be able 
to perform the essential functions of the job.213  Of course, only if the 
accommodation is reasonable and does not cause an undue hardship 
does the accommodation have to be granted.  An accommodation 
would not be reasonable if it required the elimination of an essential 
function of the job.214 
c. Pregnancy 
Although many pregnant women proceed through their entire 
pregnancies without any difficulties, some women are put on certain 
restrictions by their doctors because of actual or potential 
complications with the pregnancy.215  For instance, some doctors might 
place a pregnant woman on a lifting restriction, demanding that she 
not lift more than a certain amount.216  In other cases, if the employee 
has a physically arduous job, the doctor might ask that she be placed 
on light duty.217 
 
 213  See id. at 697 (discussing the fact that many workplace environments and pieces 
of equipment have been built around or structured with the average man in mind, 
thereby excluding many women); Jessica L. Roberts, Accommodating the Female Body: A 
Disability Paradigm of Sex Discrimination, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 1297, 1303–05 (2008) 
(exploring cockpits, machinery, and other workplace characteristics that 
unintentionally exclude many women and individuals with disabilities). 
 214  See, e.g., Hill v. Walker, 737 F.3d 1209, 1217 (8th Cir. 2013) (stating that 
employers need not eliminate essential functions of the job to accommodate an 
employee with a disability); D’Angelo v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 422 F.3d 1220, 1229 
(11th Cir. 2005).  Because the employer would be required to consider the 
accommodation requested by a small woman, however, the employer might realize 
that there are alternative ways to perform the particular function.  See Stein et al., supra 
note 20, at 697 n.31 (pointing to the example of women generally being unable to 
perform the fireman’s lift to rescue people from a burning building, but noting there 
are other modes of rescue that allow women to execute the same function in an 
alternative manner). 
 215  See generally Bradley Areheart, Accommodating Pregnancy, 67 ALA. L. REV. 1125 
(2016).  
 216  See, e.g., Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338, 1344 (2015) (noting 
that the plaintiff’s doctor “told her she should not lift more than twenty pounds during 
the first twenty weeks of her pregnancy or more than ten pounds thereafter.”).  
 217  Tysinger v. Police Dep’t of Zanesville, 463 F.3d 569, 571 (6th Cir. 2006) (noting 
that the plaintiff’s doctor put her on light duty from her job as a police officer after 
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Under my proposal, in cases where the doctor places the pregnant 
woman on restrictions to protect the health of the woman or the 
unborn baby, the accommodation is considered necessary and the 
employer would have to provide it, absent being able to prove that the 
accommodation is unreasonable or creates an undue hardship under 
the more stringent standard—significant difficulty or expense.218 
d. Unavoidable Caregiving Obligations 
In addition to situations where individuals cannot perform the 
physical functions of the job without an accommodation, I also believe 
an accommodation is necessary if a caregiver would be neglecting 
unavoidable caregiving obligations without it.  Although delineating 
the precise boundaries and parameters of these unavoidable 
caregiving obligations is beyond the scope of this Article, I have a 
rough idea of where that line should be drawn. 
As I have discussed above and elsewhere,219 some of the most 
troubling stories involve caregivers having to choose between their job 
and caring for their minor children.  For instance, one woman was 
terminated because her child was in a car accident and had to be taken 
to the hospital.220  Another mother left her children aged one and nine 
alone because the babysitter had not arrived and the mother feared 
termination if she did not report to work; while she was gone, the 
children died in a fire.221  In another horrendous case, a caregiver left 
a two-year-old child home alone to avoid losing her job and, in her 
absence, the child fell from a balcony and died.222  Some parents force 
older children to miss school to stay home and care for younger 
children who are sick.223  Another caregiver lost her job because she 
stayed home with her child who had the flu.224 
Accordingly, one reform I proposed in earlier work was to protect 
 
she was in an altercation with a suspect).  
 218  42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(A) (2008).  
 219  Porter, Why Care, supra note 4, at 407–09. 
 220  9TO5, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF WORKING WOMEN, 10 Things That Could Happen 
to You if You Didn’t Have Paid Sick Days And The Best Way to Make Sure They Never Happen 
to Anyone, 4 (2014), 
http://njtimetocare.com/sites/default/files/18_Ten%20Things%20That%20Could
%20Happen%20to%20You%20if%20You%20Didnt%20Have%20Paid%20Sick%20D
ays.pdf.  
 221  Nina Bernstein, Daily Choice Turned Deadly: Children Left on Their Own, N.Y. TIMES 
(Oct. 19, 2003), http://www.nytimes.com/2003/10/19/nyregion/daily-choice-
turned-deadly-children-left-on-their-own.html.  
 222  See id. 
 223  Porter, Why Care, supra note 4, at 408. 
 224  See id. 
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caregivers from termination in these situations.225  In other words, at a 
bare minimum, caregivers who would be terminated if they are not 
given an accommodation that is needed to keep them from neglecting 
unavoidable caregiving obligations should be accommodated.  Only if 
the accommodation would cause an undue hardship using the more 
stringent ADA standard—significant difficulty or expense—should the 
accommodation be refused. 
Thus, even though defining unavoidable caregiving obligations is 
not easy, we should all be able to agree that employees should be 
protected when they miss work because they have no responsible 
person with whom to leave a child under the age of twelve, despite 
having made reasonable efforts to find such a person.226  Such a 
situation might arise because the child’s illness precluded attendance 
at a group-based daycare or school, because a babysitter is too ill to 
care for the child or otherwise does not show up for work, or because 
the child’s school is unexpectedly closed.227  Certainly there are likely 
to be disputes regarding what constitutes reasonable efforts to find 
alternative care arrangements, as well as defining who is a responsible 
person.228 
One way to solve some of these disputes is to borrow from 
Professor Peggie Smith, who has proposed using the standards from 
unemployment compensation cases in order to define unavoidable 
caregiving obligations.  In her article, Accommodating Routine Parental 
Obligations in an Era of Work-Family Conflict: Lessons from Religious 
Accommodations,229 Professor Smith proposes a model for 
accommodating parental obligations that focuses on “compelling 
parental obligations.”230  Her proposal requires an employee seeking 
accommodation to demonstrate that the employee (1) faced a 
compelling parental obligation that conflicted with an employment 
requirement; (2) informed the employer about the conflict; and (3) 
was discharged or disciplined for failing to comply with the conflicting 
employment requirement.231  If the employee could prove this, then 
the employer would have the burden of proving that the employer 
made a good faith effort to accommodate the employee’s parental 
 
 225  Id. at 407–09. 
 226  Id. at 409.  
 227  Id. 
 228  Id. 
 229  Peggie R. Smith, Accommodating Routine Parental Obligations in an Era of Work-
Family Conflict: Lessons from Religious Accommodations, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 1443 (2001). 
 230  Id. at 1465–79.  
 231  Id. at 1466.  
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obligations or that the employer was unable to reasonably 
accommodate the employee without experiencing an undue 
hardship.232  So Professor Smith’s proposal—similar to mine—requires 
determining what is considered a “compelling parental obligation.” 
To do so, Professor Smith relies on unemployment compensation 
case law.233  As explained by Smith, employees who are terminated from 
their jobs may be eligible for unemployment compensation, but they 
are usually ineligible if they voluntarily quit their jobs or are fired for 
misconduct.234  Courts often apply a “good cause” standard in assessing 
whether an employee leaves a job voluntarily.235  Thus, courts are often 
required to consider whether employees had good cause for 
voluntarily leaving their employment based on work-family conflicts.236  
Smith uses these decisions to help delineate the parameters of when 
employees are faced with compelling parental obligations that require 
accommodation.237 
Some of the cases where the employee was able to prove that she 
had good cause to voluntarily quit her employment or to refute an 
employer’s argument that it terminated for misconduct include: when 
an employer suddenly and dramatically changes an employee’s 
schedule, making the employee’s prior daycare arrangement 
unworkable (and the employee cannot find an affordable alternative 
compatible with the new shift);238 changing an employee’s schedule 
from a predictable shift to one that varies daily where the employee 
had no alternative daycare on the days she was required to work until 
8:30 p.m.;239 and where an employee was fired for missing two days of 
work after her employer changed her shift to the evening shift and she 
was unable to arrange alternative childcare.240  As explained by Smith, 
these cases and others like them include two related inquiries: the 
significance of the parental obligation at stake and the reasonableness 
of the employee’s efforts to meet that obligation.241 
Smith explains that courts are more likely to find that good cause 
led an employee to quit her job when the employee’s family 
 
 232  Id.  
 233  Id. at 1467–72. 
 234  Id. at 1467. 
 235  Smith, supra note 229, at 1467.  
 236  Id. at 1468.  
 237  Id. 
 238  Id. at 1468 (citing White v. Sec. Link, 658 A.2d 619 (Del. Super. Ct. 1994)).  
 239  Id. at 1469 (citing Newland v. Job Serv. N.D., 460 N.W.2d 118 (N.D. 1990)). 
 240  Id. at 1469–70 (citing King v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 414 A.2d 
452 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1980)). 
 241  Smith, supra note 229, at 1470. 
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responsibility is deemed “compelling and necessitous.”242  This occurs 
when there are “circumstances that . . . would compel a reasonable 
person under those circumstances to act in the same manner.”243  Thus, 
when an employee is forced to quit her job because she refuses to leave 
her children unaccompanied at home in the evening, this would be 
considered a compelling reason to separate from her job.244  Smith 
recognizes (as do I) that not all caregiving obligations are compelling 
(or unavoidable as I refer to them).  For instance, she argues that an 
employee’s desire to leave work early to attend a child’s softball game 
is not compelling, nor is taking time off to accompany a child on a class 
field trip.245  Both of these situations do not present circumstances that 
would compel a reasonable person to separate from his or her job.246  
As Smith summarizes: “The underlying premise of this proposal is that 
some parental sacrifices are unacceptable: employees should not be 
forced unnecessarily to choose between the fundamental welfare of 
their children and employment.”247 
I recognize that, even with the explanation above, “unavoidable 
caregiving obligations” is still a vague term.  But as Smith notes, using 
the precedent from unemployment compensation cases can provide 
guidance for determining when a caregiving obligation should be 
deemed compelling or unavoidable.  If we ask the same question as the 
unemployment compensation courts ask—would a reasonable person 
be compelled to quit if faced with a similar dilemma between caring 
for children and work?—we should arrive at the correct answer. 
2. All Other Accommodation Requests 
All of the above “necessary” accommodations should be granted 
as long as the accommodation does not cause an undue hardship for 
the employer under the more stringent definition of “significant 
difficulty or expense.”  Under my proposal, all other accommodation 
requests should still be granted unless the accommodation would 
cause an undue hardship under the more lenient standard of anything 
more than a de minimis expense. 
This category would basically encompass everything else not 
defined as a “necessary” accommodation above.  Some reasons an 
employee might seek a workplace accommodation include: advancing 
 
 242  Id. at 1471.  
 243  Id. 
 244  Id. 
 245  Id.  
 246  Id. 
 247  Smith, supra note 229, at 1471. 
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her education; community volunteering or other civic engagement; a 
second job or starting a business;248 and other intellectual, physical, or 
emotional pursuits.  These types of pursuits might lead an employee to 
request a schedule change or reduced hours for a period of time.  
Although not all jobs allow for an easy adjustment of working hours, 
many employers have found that schedule changes, especially minor 
adjustments to the starting and stopping time, are relatively simple to 
provide. 
The two more difficult or controversial categories that would fall 
under the more lenient undue hardship standard (because they would 
not be classified as “necessary”) are religious accommodation requests 
and caregiving accommodation requests that are not for “unavoidable 
caregiving obligations,” discussed above. 
a. Religion 
As noted above, Title VII requires employers to accommodate an 
employee’s bona fide religious beliefs and practices if they conflict with 
a workplace rule: 
The term “religion” includes all aspects of religious observance 
and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates 
that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee’s 
or prospective employee’s religious observance or practice 
without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s 
business.249 
Even though the statute uses the same “undue hardship” phrase as the 
ADA, the Supreme Court has defined that phrase quite differently in 
the religious accommodation context.250  The Court held in Trans 
World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison that an employer should not have to be 
short-handed or pay others premium pay through overtime in order to 
accommodate the plaintiff’s desire not to work on his Sabbath.251  
According to the Court, requiring “TWA to bear more than a de 
minimis cost in order to give Hardison Saturdays off [was] an undue 
hardship.”252  The Court believed that requiring TWA to bear 
additional costs when no such costs are incurred to give other 
employees a day off would involve “unequal treatment of employees 
 
 248  Obviously, an employer would be allowed to enforce normal non-compete 
agreements.  
 249  42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1991).  
 250  Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 64 (1977).  
 251  Id. at 84. 
 252  Id.  
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on the basis of their religion.”253  Absent legislative history to the 
contrary, the Court could not “readily construe the statute to require 
an employer to discriminate against some employees in order to 
enable others to observe their Sabbath.”254 
Two things likely account for the difference between how the 
religious accommodation provision is treated as compared to the 
ADA’s reasonable accommodation provision.  First, because the ADA 
protects only individuals with disabilities, it does not allow for “reverse 
discrimination” claims.255  The religious accommodation provision, on 
the other hand, is part of Title VII, which protects all employees based 
on their religion (in addition to race, color, sex, and national origin).256  
And second, there is some evidence that the Court narrowly defined 
employers’ obligations to accommodate religious practices to avoid a 
conflict with the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.257 
Although there have been proposals to expand the reasonable 
accommodation obligation for religion,258 thus far, neither the 
Supreme Court nor Congress has broadened the coverage of the 
religious accommodation provision.  Although I would not be opposed 
to broadened coverage for religious accommodations—that is, 
requiring employers to accommodate employees’ religious practices as 
long as those accommodations do not result in “significant difficulty or 
expense”—my proposal maintains the status quo with respect to 
religious accommodations. 
b. Avoidable Caregiving Obligations 
As discussed above, I recognize that distinguishing between 
avoidable and unavoidable caregiving obligations is difficult.  Yet, I 
believe we need to make a real effort to do so, for reasons that I 
describe more fully below.  Obviously, the question that would be 
asked in these cases is whether the caregiving obligation is unavoidable, 
not avoidable.  But just to give the reader an idea of what types of 
caregiving tasks or obligations I think are avoidable, here is a brief (and 
 
 253  Id.  
 254  Id. at 85.  
 255  Porter, Backlash, supra note 13, at 7.  
 256  Trans World Airlines, 432 U.S. at 81 (“The repeated, unequivocal emphasis of 
both the language and the legislative history of Title VII is on eliminating 
discrimination in employment, and such discrimination is proscribed when it is 
directed against majorities as well as minorities.”).  
 257  Leach C. Myers, Disability Harassment: How Far Should the ADA Follow in the 
Footsteps of Title VII?, 17 BYU J. PUB. L. 265, 268–69 (2003).  
 258  See, e.g., Nantiya Ruan, Accommodating Respectful Religious Expression in the 
Workplace, 92 MARQ. L. REV. 1, 3 (2008).  
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incomplete) list. 
If a caregiver asked for reduced hours (or modified hours) so she 
could be home every day at 3:00 p.m. when her kids get home from 
school—assuming that her children do not have special needs or she 
does not live in an area where after-school care is unavailable—this 
would be an avoidable caregiving obligation.  Similarly, if a caregiver 
asked for reduced hours or a compressed workweek so she could have 
one or two days off every week to spend with her baby or toddler, this 
would be an avoidable caregiving obligation.  Absences that exceeded 
an employer’s attendance policy that were requested to allow a parent 
to attend a child’s game or performance or to volunteer at the child’s 
school or on a school field trip would be an avoidable caregiving task. 
To be clear, I think employers should consider all of these 
requested accommodations and grant them when possible.  Under this 
proposal, employees would have a right to request these 
accommodations and the employer could refuse them only if they 
resulted in an undue hardship as defined under the more lenient 
standard of anything more than de minimis expense. 
However, many of these requests would not cost an employer any 
money or result in any loss of productivity.  For instance, a request for 
modified hours (but not a reduction in total hours) is often a very easy 
accommodation to grant, assuming the individual’s job can be 
performed at any time.259  And an extra absence or two because an 
employee wants to attend a school performance or volunteer at a 
school field trip or party is unlikely to cause any hardship on the 
employer.  Either the employee is paid hourly and is therefore not paid 
for that missed time or the employee is salaried and will likely make 
the time up later in the day or week. 
My point is not to say that all accommodations will have to be 
granted.  Rather, my point is simply that, once employers are required 
to consider these types of requests, they might realize how easy it is for 
them to grant many or most of them. 
 
 259  In fact, “flex time” or flexible working hours is the most frequently provided 
accommodation given to caregivers.  See Ellen Galinsky et al., 2008 National Study of 
Employers, FAMILIES AND WORK INST. 6 (2008), 
http://familiesandwork.org/site/research/reports/2008nse.pdf (stating that 79% of 
employers now allow at least some employees to periodically change their arrival and 
departure time). 
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D. Justifying this Universal Accommodation Mandate 
1. Partially Remedying the Caregiver Conundrum 
There are several benefits of this proposal, and I imagine different 
readers will be motivated by different reasons.  Based on my interests, 
one of the primary justifications for this proposal is to provide 
assistance to caregivers trying to balance work and family.  As I have 
discussed in depth elsewhere, caregivers have very few rights to a 
flexible workplace—that is, one that allows them to balance work and 
family.260  Other than limited leave under the FMLA, and the right to 
be free from discrimination based on pregnancy, caregivers are not 
entitled to any accommodations to allow them to balance work and 
family.261  Thus, caregivers are often at the whim of the strict attendance 
policies of some employers, and many caregivers have no ability to 
control their schedules or the number of hours they work.262 
This proposal would allow these employees to request modified 
schedules or to miss work if needed to care for a sick child or take a 
child to the doctor.  Even though not all caregiving responsibilities 
would be considered unavoidable and thus subject to the more 
stringent undue hardship test, employees could seek an 
accommodation for all caregiving obligations.  If the employer refuses 
the request, the employer would be required to prove that the 
accommodation results in more than a de minimis expense.  The hope 
is that employers would begin to realize that many of these 
accommodations are inexpensive or even costless. 
As I have discussed before, communitarian theory helps us 
understand that helping caregivers successfully balance work and 
family benefits everyone.263  This is true for several reasons.  First, at a 
very basic level, we all benefit from parents’ choices to procreate 
because society needs procreation to continue and employers need 
procreation to continue to staff their workplaces.264  Professor Fineman 
frequently refers to caretaking work as an “important and essential 
public good.  Every society and every institution in society is dependent 
 
 260  See, e.g., Porter, Why Care, supra note 4, at 370–80; Porter, Stigma, supra note 26, 
at 235–36.  
 261  Porter, Why Care, supra note 4, at 361–63.  
 262  Id. at 363–65.  
 263  Porter, Why Care, supra note 4, at 396–98.  The remainder of this subpart is 
derived in significant part from Porter, Why Care, supra note 4, at 395–403.  However, 
to avoid excessive citations to my prior work, I will cite to the original sources cited in 
that piece. 
 264  Lucinda M. Finley, Transcending Equality Theory: A Way Out of the Maternity and 
the Workplace Debate, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1118, 1137–38 (1986).  
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upon caretaking labor in order to perpetuate and reproduce itself.”265  
Second, everyone lives with the consequences of children who are not 
brought up well and who then harm communities through misconduct 
and crime.266  Third, even non-caregivers should support 
accommodations provided for caregiving because non-caregivers 
could find themselves engaging in caregiving involuntarily.  Even if 
they do not have children, many workers have spouses/partners and 
parents, and many of these adult loved ones could become disabled 
and dependent as they age.267  And there are benefits to having 
dependent adults cared for by loved ones.  Not only do adults have 
better health and happiness outcomes when cared for by loved ones,268 
but also, society needs the thirty-three million unpaid family caregivers 
to continue giving that care—the long-term care system would collapse 
and  nursing homes would burst at the seams without the unpaid work 
of family caregivers.269  Finally, we all benefit from allowing caregivers 
to balance work and family because this means that as we age or 
become disabled and need care, we will reap the benefits of having 
institutional structures in place that will allow our loved ones to care 
for us without sacrificing their jobs.270 
2. Avoiding the Difficulty and Stigma of Classification 
Another benefit of this proposal is that accommodating everyone 
mostly avoids the stigma of classification.  In order to be protected 
under current law, an employee has to fall into a particular protected 
class.  Primarily, this includes individuals with disabilities, but it also 
might include those who need accommodations for religious practices 
or, after the decision in Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc.,271 pregnant 
workers.  Although it is not difficult to establish that you belong to a 
particular religion or that you are pregnant, it is more difficult to 
establish that you have a disability, even after the Amendments have 
 
 265  Martha Albertson Fineman, Contract and Care, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1403, 1406 
(2001).  
 266  AMITAI ETZIONI, THE SPIRIT OF COMMUNITY: RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND THE 
COMMUNITARIAN AGENDA 54, 69 (1993).  
 267  Porter, Why Care, supra note 4, at 399. 
 268  K. Nicole Harms, Caring for Mom & Dad: The Importance of Family-Provided 
Eldercare and the Positive Implications of California’s Paid Family Leave Law, 10 WM. & MARY 
J. WOMEN & L. 69, 83–85 (2003). 
 269  Jane Gross, Who Cares for the Caregivers?, N.Y. TIMES: NEW OLD AGE (Oct. 14, 
2008), http://newoldage.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/10/14/who-cares-for-the-
caregivers/.  
 270  Porter, Why Care, supra note 4, at 400. 
 271  Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338 (2015). 
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made it much easier to do so.272 
Under my proposal, an individual would need a doctor’s note to 
verify that there is some function of the job that the employee cannot 
do or that the employee needs an accommodation for the employer’s 
workplace structural norms (schedules, shifts, hours, etc.) because of 
a mental or physical condition.  But the employee would not be 
required to prove to the employer that the condition qualifies as a 
disability.  Not only is this an easier burden to meet for the employee, 
but it also avoids the stigma of being classified as “disabled.”273  
Professor Albiston has also discussed the stigma that attaches from 
having to be classified in a protected group in order to receive 
accommodations.  She states, “[f]ocusing on how work must change to 
accommodate disability and gender marks women and people with 
disabilities as separate and different from all workers, who become 
normalized in the process.”274  Accommodating everyone avoids the 
stigma of group classification. 
3. Encouraging Changes to Workplace Structures 
Although this proposal calls for an individual accommodation 
mandate, the hope is that it ultimately encourages employers to see the 
benefits of making broader structural changes to their workplaces.275  
For instance, if several employees in one workplace seek an 
accommodation of flextime hours, the employer might realize that 
allowing flextime is not only relatively simple, but also that it would be 
more efficient for the employer to set up a system whereby all 
employees can work flextime rather than making individual 
modifications for those employees who seek an accommodation.276  
Similarly, several requests for a modification of the physical functions 
of the job—perhaps for employees with lifting restrictions because of 
a back impairment, pregnancy, or small stature—might cause the 
employer to realize that there is a better way of performing that lifting 
 
 272  See generally Porter, Backlash, supra note 13. 
 273  See also Stein et al., supra note 20, at 752–53 (“Detaching the right to 
accommodation from assignment of a special disability identity is consistent with 
integrating employees with disabilities rather than marking, and perhaps stigmatizing, 
them as essentially different from most workers.”). 
 274  ALBISTON, supra note 60, at 148.  
 275  See, e.g., Porter, Stigma, supra note 26, at 259 (arguing that accommodating more 
employees could lead to employers restructuring the workplace).  
 276  See also Stein et al., supra note 20, at 751 (stating that their “accommodating 
every body” proposal should lead “employers who value efficiency and innovation to 
prophylactically implement changes in policy so as to make the workplace more 
accessible for everyone”).  
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function.277  This will not only help employees who have lifting 
restrictions but also might cause fewer employees to get injured on the 
job, reducing the employers’ workers compensation costs. 
In some ways, this proposal is similar to proposals in favor of 
“universal design,” which is an architectural principle in which 
environments are designed to be useable by everyone to the maximum 
extent possible.278  As noted by Stein and his co-authors, if “employers 
anticipate having to make more accommodation-related changes to 
the workplace environment, they may be more apt to invest time and 
effort on the earlier ‘design’ end to avoid subsequent needs to 
retrofit.”279  Professor Albiston also argues in favor of these types of 
structural changes.  She argues that the question should be focused 
not on who needs changes to the workplace structure, but rather, on 
whether the workplace could be restructured.280  She states, “[t]his 
approach queries whether a work practice is necessary or desirable, 
and does not simply assume it is necessary because it is part of the way 
things have always been done.”281 
4. Providing Economic Benefits 
This proposal provides economic benefits not just to the 
employees who receive the accommodations, but also to employers 
and society.  Most obviously, the employees who are accommodated 
are benefitted by experiencing “higher levels of job satisfaction,” 
“stronger intentions to remain with their employers,” less negative 
spillover between work and home, and better mental health.282  This is 
especially true in cases where not accommodating them might lead to 
their termination (if they cannot perform the job without the 
accommodation) or their resignation (if they cannot get an 
accommodation that allows them to meet their caregiving obligations).  
Accommodating employees allows them to avoid the devastating 
 
 277  See id. (“Employers and employees would join together efficiently to adjust 
features of the job to help capable persons work, keep working, or otherwise optimize 
workplace productivity—all of these outcomes being results that avail management 
and worker alike.”). 
 278  Stein et al., supra note 20, at 751; Ani B. Satz, Disability, Vulnerability, and the 
Limits of Antidiscrimination, 83 WASH. L. REV. 513, 560 (2008) (stating that universal 
design principles could guide the planning of a facility’s infrastructure and “[b]y 
accommodating a greater number of ways of functioning at the construction stage, 
fewer buildings would need to be retrofitted as access issues arise”).  
 279  Stein et al., supra note 20, at 751.  
 280  ALBISTON, supra note 60, at 107. 
 281  Id.  
 282  Galinsky et al., supra note 259, at 3.  
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consequences of unemployment.283 
But it is not just the accommodated employees and their families 
who benefit from accommodations.  Employers also benefit by keeping 
valuable employees.  The perceived costs of accommodation are often 
greatly over-estimated,284  and the actual costs of attrition are quite 
high.285  By providing reasonable accommodations that do not result in 
an undue financial burden, employers would keep valuable employees 
who would be more productive because of the accommodation.  At the 
same time, employers would avoid the high costs of attrition.286  
Moreover, studies indicate that employees who are accommodated are 
happier, more productive, and more loyal.287 
Society also benefits when workers are accommodated.  Especially 
with respect to workers with disabilities, accommodating them 
increases the likelihood that they will remain employed and will thus 
not need to rely on public benefits.288 
5. Providing Balance to Everyone 
There has been renewed interest recently in the idea that 
everyone needs balance in their lives—not just caregivers or those 
employees who are dealing with a medical condition.  Professor Trina 
Jones, in Single and Childfree! Reassessing Parental and Marital Status 
Discrimination, argues that providing family-friendly benefits only to 
parents involves “implicit assumptions about the personal activities of 
[childfree workers] and risk[s] perpetuating the notion that the 
 
 283  Nicole Buonocore Porter, Martinizing Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 
47 GA. L. REV. 527, 581 (2013); Nicole B. Porter, Reasonable Burdens: Resolving the 
Conflict Between Disabled Employees and Their Coworkers, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 313, 336–37 
(2007) [hereinafter Porter, Reasonable Burdens] (discussing the negative consequences 
of termination).  
 284  Schur et al., supra note 18, at 609 (stating that most accommodations have no 
or very low costs); Porter, supra note 1, at 1111 n.61 (citing sources demonstrating that 
the costs of accommodation are greatly over-estimated).  
 285  Porter, supra note 1, at 1142; Schur et al., supra note 18, at 614.  
 286  Porter, Why Care, supra note 4, at 381 n.194; Galinsky et al., supra note 259, at 3 
(stating that employers benefit from providing family-friendly workplaces because they 
have “more engaged employees, higher retention and potentially lower health care 
costs”).  
 287  Schur et al., supra note 18, at 607 (stating that individuals whose 
accommodation requests were granted had better attitudes on important workplace 
measures); id. at 612–13 (stating that a majority of employees in the study who had 
received accommodations said the accommodations had a variety of positive impacts, 
including more loyalty to the company; increased employee morale and job 
satisfaction).  
 288  Stein et al., supra note 20, at 754 (stating that “empirical data show that receiving 
a workplace accommodation reduces the likelihood that someone will apply for SSDI 
benefits”). 
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people and activities in a [childfree worker’s] life are not as important 
as the people and activities in the lives of married couples or 
parents.”289  Jones counters the point about the societal value of caring 
for children by pointing to other scenarios that also have social value, 
such as when a childfree employee assists a sibling who has lost a job 
or an employee elects to support a community center in a low-income 
neighborhood.290  She states, “[t]he point is that employees engage in 
many socially valuable activities outside of the workplace.  Merely 
asserting that parenting should be subsidized because it may produce 
positive consequences does not explain why parenting should be 
elevated above these other socially valuable activities.”291  Some of the 
other important activities that childfree employees might engage in 
include: “furthering one’s education, volunteering with a homeless 
shelter, or working with other community organizations.”292  She also 
points out that childfree workers engage in other kinds of caregiving, 
such as “caring for friends, siblings, neighbors, and other people’s 
children.”293  And yet, under the current law, caregiving is defined 
narrowly; for instance, the FMLA only allows leave to care for a spouse, 
parent, or child, ignoring the significance of other close 
relationships.294 
The point made by Jones is an important one.  Single, childfree 
workers might not want to spend every minute working.295  They might 
want to enjoy a healthy balance between work and the rest of their lives.  
Thus, she argues that employers should adopt policies that all 
employees can use.296  Rather than thinking only in terms of “family-
friendly” policies, “employers would aim to design workplaces that 
produce greater work-life balance for all workers.”297  As she poignantly 
points out: “[f]riends care for friends.  Neighbors look out for each 
other. . . . [a]nd, family love is not solely directed at spouses, parents, 
and children, but includes aunts, uncles, siblings, and cousins.”298 
 
 289  Jones, supra note 166, at 1301.  
 290  Id. at 1304.  
 291  Id.  
 292  Id. at 1308.  
 293  Id.  
 294  Id. at 1272. 
 295  Jones, supra note 166, at 1314. 
 296  Id. at 1330. 
 297  Id. at 1330–31; see also Vicki Schultz & Allison Hoffman, The Need for a Reduced 
Workweek in the United States, in PRECARIOUS WORK, WOMEN, AND THE NEW ECONOMY: THE 
CHALLENGE TO LEGAL NORMS 131, 135 (Judy Fudge & Rosemary Owens eds., 2006) 
(arguing in favor of reduced hours for all employees to ensure sufficient time for 
“family, community, and leisure”).  
 298  Jones, supra note 166, at 1342.  
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6. Avoiding Special Treatment Stigma 
Last, but certainly not least, this proposal can make significant 
steps in minimizing and hopefully299 eliminating special treatment 
stigma.  Quite simply, if all employees were entitled to 
accommodations, there would no longer be any special treatment; 
thus, there would no longer be “special treatment stigma.”300 
This rationale was also relied on in the Accommodating Every Body 
article, discussed above.  As the authors of that article note, 
normalizing accommodations by making them available to everyone 
will remove the perception that accommodations are stigmatizing.301  
Furthermore, in a study of the reactions of employees and employers 
regarding accommodations in the workplace, the authors conclude 
that reform should be aimed at accommodating all employees.302  
Specifically, they argue that accommodations “need to be viewed in the 
context of accommodations for the personal needs of all employees, 
and that accommodations may not only maximize the inclusion of 
people with disabilities but may have positive spillovers on other 
employees that foster overall workplace productivity.”303  They also 
point out that some companies are already trying to accommodate all 
employees, specifically mentioning those who have work/life balance 
issues.304  In the caregiving context, several scholars have argued that 
providing workplace flexibility benefits to all employees will eliminate 
the stigma of only providing family-friendly benefits to caregivers.305  In 
sum, because providing accommodations only to some employees is so 
stigmatizing, eliminating that stigma through a universal 
accommodation mandate is the primary goal of and justification for 
this proposal. 
 
 299  I use the word “hopefully” because, as I will discuss infra Part IV.A, it is possible 
that some stigma would remain even if this proposal were adopted. 
 300  Porter, supra note 1, at 1133–36; Porter, Stigma, supra note 26, at 258–59 
(discussing the benefits of accommodating everyone).  
 301  Stein et al., supra note 20, at 750, 755.  
 302  Schur et al., supra note 18, at 614–16.  
 303  Id. at 616.  
 304  Id. at 605, 614.  
 305  See, e.g., Jones, supra note 166, at 1331; Schultz & Hoffman, supra note 297, at 
140 (stating that adopting a universal approach of a reduced workweek for everyone 
would free caregivers of the stigma associated with more targeted benefits); Mary Anne 
Case, How High the Apple Pie? A Few Troubling Questions About Where, Why, and How the 
Burden of Care for Children Should Be Shifted, 76 CHI.–KENT L. REV. 1753, 1768 (2001) 
(stating that by accommodating all employees’ hobbies and personal pursuits, we will 
reduce the stigma of providing workplace benefits to only some).  
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IV. RESPONDING TO THE CRITICS 
I recognize that this proposal will be seen by some as fairly radical.  
Thus, in this Part, I have attempted to anticipate and respond to the 
primary criticisms that will be lobbed at me and this proposal. 
A. Remnants of Special Treatment Stigma 
Despite my statement above that the primary benefit of this 
proposal is eliminating special treatment stigma, I recognize that the 
possibility of some residual stigma remains.  This is for two reasons. 
First, even though everyone has a right to request and receive 
accommodations under this proposal, certain employees are slightly306 
more likely to receive those accommodations because of the two-tier 
undue hardship approach.  Those who need accommodations because 
they would not be able to perform their jobs without them and those 
who would be neglecting unavoidable caregiving obligations without 
an accommodation are entitled to the benefit of the more stringent 
undue hardship test—significant difficulty or expense.307  Although the 
first group is broader than only individuals who have a disability—it 
includes everyone who has a physical or mental condition that requires 
accommodation in order for her to be able to perform her job308—it is 
possible that this group will be perceived as comprising only or mainly 
individuals with disabilities.  The second group (the unavoidable 
caregiving obligations group) might be viewed as preferring some life 
choices (having children) over other life choices. 
I have three responses to this criticism.  First, those who express 
resentment about including unavoidable caregiving obligations should 
be reminded that not all caregivers are accommodated.  In fact, it is 
relatively difficult for an employee to prove that a caregiving obligation 
is unavoidable.309  Many caregiving requests will fall under the catch-all 
“All Other Accommodation Requests” category.  Second, caregiving is 
defined broadly to include not just caring for children but also caring 
for adult loved ones who are disabled or ill: spouses or partners, 
 
 306  I use the word “slightly” because I think the difference between the two levels 
of undue hardship will not be dispositive all that often.  This is because some 
accommodations will be deemed unreasonable before we even get to the undue 
hardship defense (imagine a request by a hotel housekeeper to be allowed to work 
from home) and because so many accommodations are costless (such as flex-time); 
thus, an employer would not be able to prove undue hardship even under the more 
lenient test. 
 307  See supra Part III.B. 
 308  Thus, as stated above, pregnant women or older employees would be included 
in this group.  See supra Part III.C.1. 
 309  See supra Part III.C.1.d. 
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parents, siblings, and other relatives.  Thus, even though someone has 
made a decision to remain child free, that person might inadvertently 
be thrust into a caregiving role because of the need to care for an adult 
loved one.  Third (and perhaps most importantly), those who need an 
accommodation to be able to perform their jobs (even if they are not 
disabled under the ADA) and those who would be neglecting 
unavoidable caregiving obligations without the accommodation need 
those accommodations to be able to keep their jobs.  Because of the 
devastating consequences of unemployment (especially for those 
employees who might have difficulty finding another job, such as 
individuals with disabilities, pregnant workers, and older employees), 
these “necessary” accommodations deserve slightly more protection 
than everything else. 
The second reason some stigma might remain despite my effort 
to eliminate it is because it is possible that, even though everyone has 
the right to seek accommodations under this proposal, only those who 
have traditionally sought accommodations will seek the benefit of this 
proposal.  In other words, because mostly women seek workplace 
modifications to manage work/life balance,310 if women and 
individuals with disabilities311 continue to request the vast majority of 
accommodations under this regime, it is likely that there will remain 
some special treatment stigma.  I do not have a great response to this 
criticism except to say that this proposal’s effectiveness will depend on 
employers and employees fully embracing it.  Perhaps accompanying 
this proposal with a strong public relations campaign emphasizing the 
benefits of accommodating everyone will help to ensure that everyone 
believes that they can and should make use of their ability to balance 
work and life goals under a universal accommodation mandate.312 
B. Employer Discretion 
Although there is some argument that a universal 
accommodation mandate can actually be beneficial because it 
eliminates the tough decisions supervisors and managers must make 
regarding who deserves accommodations and for what reasons when 
those accommodations are not required by law,313 employers might 
 
 310  Porter, supra note 1, at 1104 n.14.  
 311  Of course, I do not mean these to be mutually exclusive groups.  I recognize 
that there are many women who have disabilities, and many of them are also caregivers. 
 312  It should go without saying that this proposal would need to be accompanied 
by an anti-retaliation provision that makes it unlawful to retaliate against an employee 
who has sought his right to an accommodation under this proposal. 
 313  Porter, Reasonable Burdens, supra note 283, at 344–46. 
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object to it for exactly this reason.  In other words, some employers 
might prefer to have complete discretion in determining when to wield 
their power of granting preferential treatment.  Of course, this 
discretion can be used in illegitimate ways,314 and thus, this is a good 
reason to limit it. 
On the other side of the spectrum, this proposal might also be 
criticized because it gives too much discretion to employers, in that it 
requires them to make decisions about accommodating a much larger 
group of employees for a much broader set of reasons.315  The labor 
movement is generally suspicious of giving employers the discretion to 
decide who gets accommodations or modifications of neutral 
workplace rules.316  However, in non-unionized workplaces not bound 
by collective bargaining agreements,317 employers already have this 
discretion and many employers have likely exercised this discretion 
based on arbitrary or discriminatory reasons. 
For instance, two employees might ask for the same type of 
accommodation—a change in their schedules to better accommodate 
their caregiving obligations.  The employer might grant the request for 
one employee and not the other, perhaps based on the employer’s 
perceptions of how valuable and productive the favored employee is 
(and therefore worth keeping happy) or perhaps based on something 
less legitimate, such as old-fashioned favoritism or discrimination.  The 
employee who is granted the accommodation is told to keep it quiet 
and the employee who is denied the accommodation is likely told that 
only individuals with disabilities are allowed modifications to their 
 
 314  Matthew A. Shapiro, Labor Goals and Antidiscrimination Norms: Employer Discretion, 
Reasonable Accommodation, and the Costs of Individualized Treatment, 32 YALE L. & POL’Y 
REV. 1, 4–5 (2013) (stating that employer discretion is “a force prone to abuse” because 
employers might use their discretion in illegitimate ways).  
 315  See id. at 53, which argues against universal accommodation mandates, 
specifically because they increase the amount of discretion an employer has and can 
be used to harm the goal of organized labor.  More specifically, Shapiro argues that 
the discretion in providing accommodations could be used to harm those who support 
the union.  Id. at 32. 
 316  Id. at 33 (“While this increased flexibility promises significant benefits for 
nondisabled employees, it entails what the labor movement would regard as a 
significant cost: undermining a generally applicable workplace policy designed to 
constrain the discretion of employers and thus their ability to engage in arbitrary 
treatment.”).  
 317  I recognize that there are some unique concerns with unionized workplaces, 
especially with regard to how this proposal would interact with collective bargaining 
agreements.  However, because only around seven percent of private sector employees 
are unionized, see, e.g., Nicole Buonocore Porter, Women, Unions, and Negotiation, 14 
NEV. L.J. 465 n.1 (2014), the intricacies of how this proposal might play out in the 
context of unionized workplaces with collective bargaining agreements is beyond the 
scope of this Article.  
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schedules.  Under my proposal, the employer would have to consider 
both accommodation requests and could deny them only if they 
resulted in an undue hardship. 
I do not dispute that this proposal still leaves employers with 
discretion—in determining whether the accommodation falls into the 
“necessary” category (which determines the level of undue hardship to 
apply) and in determining whether the accommodation would cause 
an undue hardship.318  Obviously, adjusting to new employer mandates 
is never easy or painless, but just as employers have become 
accustomed to the requirements of the ADA and the FMLA, they would 
also become accustomed to this proposal.  And if it appears that 
employers are applying the requirements of this proposal in a 
discriminatory fashion319 (for instance, based on sex or race), those 
employees could and should complain (internally or externally) about 
this discrimination. 
C. Dilution 
Some scholars are opposed to universal solutions because they 
threaten to dilute the rights of disadvantaged groups by trivializing the 
more serious harms of discrimination and undermining support for 
anti-discrimination in general.320  Professor Jessica Clarke argues that 
allowing protections for everyone trivializes the needs of caregivers and 
individuals with disabilities and “water[s] down protections like 
parental leave.”321  According to Professor Clarke, a truly universal 
accommodation mandate that would allow for granting 
accommodations for “frivolous” things like “manicures, fantasy 
football, and tropical vacations” would “undermine the entire 
 
 318  Cf. Shapiro, supra note 314, at 32 (pointing out that, even in the disability 
context, employers still have discretion in granting accommodations because 
questions about who has a disability and whether a particular accommodation is 
necessary to allow the employee to perform the essential functions of the job do not 
have clear-cut answers). 
 319  Jessica Clarke has expressed concern about this problem.  She argues that when 
managers decide whether to offer work-family accommodations to some employees, 
this inevitably involves those managers making judgment calls regarding “whose ‘life’ 
is more worthy of accommodation,” which might allow the “enforcement of class, race, 
and gender biases.”  Jessica Clarke, Beyond Equality? Against the Universal Turn in 
Workplace Protections, 86 IND. L.J. 1219, 1223 (2011).  
 320  Clarke, supra note 319, at 1247; see also Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination, 
Stigma, and “Disability”, 86 VA. L. REV. 397, 401, 479–80 (2000) (expressing 
disagreement that the ADA should lead to a “universal regime of individualized 
accommodation” because he favors protection only for those whose impairments are 
“stigmatizing”). 
 321  Clarke, supra note 319, at 1278.  
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project.”322  She notes that when scholars argue in favor of universal 
mandates, they give examples like military service or volunteering 
because these look like caregiving in that they contribute to the 
“reproduction and preservation of American life and culture.”323  But a 
truly universal accommodation mandate, Professor Clarke recognizes, 
would also protect the worker who just wants to spend more time 
watching television.324  This, in turn, might dilute the protections of 
those who need them the most; 
[i]f all employees were entitled to request leave for any reason, 
and employers were not . . . permitted to inquire into a 
worker’s reasons for taking leave, then a worker who needed 
the day off to take an elderly parent to a doctor’s appointment 
would have the same chance of getting that accommodation as 
a worker who wants the day off to go fishing.325 
This is a legitimate concern regarding my proposal.  I have several 
responses.  First, using her example, it is quite possible that both 
accommodations could be granted without any hardship at all on the 
employer.  As it stands now, many employers offer several days of 
unexcused absences and even allow for the amorphous “personal 
day.”326  Thus, for many employers, saying yes to both the caregiving 
request and the fishing request would not change the status quo.  
Second, if the caregiving request was because of an “unavoidable 
caregiving obligation,” then the caregiving request would be given 
preference because it would be subject to the more stringent undue 
hardship test.  Third, in the unlikely scenario that an employer 
received both requests on the same day and concluded that it could 
only grant one without causing an undue hardship, I imagine the 
employer would naturally favor the caregiving employee. 
But I recognize that there might be situations where an employer 
is granting accommodations for reasons that most of us might think 
are unworthy of protection.  I personally would be bothered by 
someone who seeks a modification of normal workplace hours to watch 
television.  But there are all kinds of accommodation requests that 
would help an employee better balance their work life and home life 
that have nothing to do with caregiving or a medical condition, and 
yet are worthwhile to that employee’s personal well-being.  Whether 
that involves volunteering, community service, entrepreneurial efforts, 
 
 322  Id. 
 323  Id.  
 324  Id. at 1278–79. 
 325  Id. at 1279.  
 326  Porter, FMLA, supra note 44, at 361. 
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continuing one’s education, or achieving some physical fitness goal 
like running a marathon, all of these allow an employee to be renewed 
and refreshed, which will make that employee more productive as well 
as happier and more loyal.  I am admittedly bothered by some of the 
more frivolous reasons for seeking an accommodation, and there is 
part of me that wants to find a way to preclude some of those 
accommodation requests.  But if we start prioritizing some reasons over 
others, we are right back to where we started, with the stigma that 
accompanies special treatment.  In other words, the only way to 
eliminate special treatment stigma is to accommodate everyone, for all 
reasons (subject, of course, to the accommodation not causing an 
undue hardship). 
D. Cumulative Effects of Undue Hardship 
Related to the dilution issue is the concern that those who need 
the protections the most might not get an accommodation because of 
the cumulative effects of undue hardship.  For example, imagine that 
five employees in the same department327 seek to work flextime, 
whereby they want to come in at 7 a.m. and leave at 3 p.m.  Three of 
these employees are seeking this schedule to allow them to be home 
after school with their children (this would most likely not be 
considered an unavoidable caregiving obligation).  One employee 
wants the schedule because he is training for a marathon and this 
schedule would allow him to train in the afternoons throughout the 
fall and winter before it gets dark.  Another employee has kidney 
failure and needs this work schedule to accommodate his kidney 
dialysis treatments.  Let us further imagine that the first four 
employees request and are granted this accommodation before the 
fifth employee requests the accommodation.  When the fifth employee 
(the individual with a disability) requests the accommodation, the 
employer legitimately believes that it cannot manage effectively with 
five employees not working from 3:00-5:00 p.m.  In other words, viewed 
cumulatively, the fifth employee’s request would cause an undue 
hardship for this employer, even using the more stringent undue 
hardship test (significant difficulty or expense).  Simply by virtue of 
timing, and the cumulative effects of undue hardship, the employee 
with the most significant need for the accommodation might have his 
accommodation request rejected. 
There are several ways to respond to this problem.  One response 
 
 327  The ADA protects employers with fifteen or more employees.  42 U.S.C. § 
12111(5)(A) (2008).  However, it is certainly possible that a specific department of a 
particular employer would be relatively small.  
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might be to recognize a “first in time” rule, and allow the first four 
accommodation seekers to keep their accommodations and explain to 
the fifth individual that he is out of luck because he did not request his 
accommodation sooner.  This strikes me as a very perverse result for 
the reasons discussed above in the section on dilution.328  Some 
accommodation requests are truly more compelling than others—
recognition of that fact is the reason for the two-tier undue hardship. 
Another solution to this problem is to make the grant of 
accommodations to the first four employees conditional,329 where they 
are told that they can enjoy the accommodation as long as someone 
with superior rights does not seek the same accommodation.  This 
would only happen in the admittedly rare case where several 
employees requested the same accommodation and the employer 
experienced an undue hardship because of the cumulative effect of 
the multiple requests.  For instance, in this case, the employer might 
argue that because the fifth employee has a morally superior need for 
the accommodation, one of the other employees who received the 
accommodation has to relinquish it so that the employee with the 
disability can get the schedule he needs to continue working with his 
disability. 
I recognize that this approach might exacerbate the special 
treatment stigma that I am trying so hard to eliminate.  My response is 
to revert to my reliance on the ideals espoused by communitarian 
theory.  Communitarian theory places less emphasis on individual 
rights and more of an emphasis on working together with others in our 
community to support common goals.330  If we viewed the “workplace 
as a community and understood ourselves as having a responsibility to 
others in our community,” some of the resentment coworkers feel 
could be dissipated.331  For instance, if the marathon-running employee 
understood that the employee with kidney failure would not be able to 
continue working without an accommodation, the marathon runner 
should be willing to relinquish his right to the flextime in favor of the 
 
 328  See supra Part IV.C.  
 329  This idea has a corollary in the area of riparian rights to a body of water.  Under 
common law riparianism, owners of land adjacent to a river or lake have the right to 
withdraw a reasonable amount of the water, subject to the correlative rights of other 
riparians to also make reasonable water withdrawals.  Thus, no riparian has a right to 
withdraw a fixed amount of water in perpetuity; it all depends on a variety of factors, 
including the relative value of the various uses of the water.  See generally RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 850A (AM. LAW INST. 1979).  Hat-tip to Professor Kenneth Kilbert 
for giving me this example.  
 330  Porter, supra note 1, at 1142.  
 331  Id.  
PORTER (DO NOT DELETE) 11/3/2016  1:17 PM 
136 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:85 
employee with a disability. 
Finally, it is not entirely clear whether cumulative effects should 
be considered when determining undue hardship.332  This is an 
undeveloped and unclear area in disability law; thus, settling on a 
definitive answer here is premature.  Thus, whether the cumulative 
effect of accommodations should be considered in the ADA context 
and in the context of my universal accommodation mandate is a 
subject left for further study. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Accommodating only certain groups of employees has led to the 
situation where accommodations are viewed with skepticism and often 
resentment by both employers and the coworkers of those who receive 
accommodations.  This Article argues that this special treatment 
stigma can only be eliminated by accommodating everyone.  However, 
unlike other proposals that argue in favor of accommodating only 
those employees who need the accommodation to be able to perform 
their jobs, or those scholars who propose accommodating everyone 
indiscriminately, this proposal argues that we can accommodate 
everyone while still recognizing that some requests for accommodation 
are more compelling than others—hence, the two-tier undue hardship 
test.  I realize that many of the details of this proposal are left 
unspecified.  It was not my goal to write a statute.  Instead, my hope is 
to start a conversation about accommodating everyone. 
 
 
 332  Id. at 1137.  Compare Kralik v. Durbin, 130 F.3d 76, 87 (3d Cir. 1997) 
(Mansmann, J., dissenting), with David Harger, Drawing the Line Between Reasonable 
Accommodation and Undue Hardship Under the Americans with Disabilities Act: Reducing the 
Effects of Ambiguity on Small Businesses, 41 U. KAN. L. REV. 783, 790 (1993) (stating that 
the “issue of whether the cumulative effect of multiple accommodations upon the 
employer constitutes undue hardship is not addressed in the statute or in the EEOC 
regulations”). 
